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THE POTENTIAL OF FLORIDA'S EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
DOCTRINE TO INCREASE PARENT ENGAGEMENT AND PROMOTE THE
WELL-BEING OF CHILDREN

Robert Latham* and Robin Rosenberg**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Florida has experienced three major shifts that significantly
affected the representation of parents in its child welfare system. The
first was the statutory appointment of counsel to all parents for both
dependency and termination cases. The second was the creation of the
Office of Regional Conflict Counsel, which represents one parent in
each case by assigning a staff attorney in a public defender model, with
the court appointing every other parent on the case a private attorney
from a registry. The third was the statutory imposition of flat fee billing
on those private attorneys.
More recently, a fourth shift potentially occurred in 2015 when
the Florida Supreme Court ruled that parents in termination proceedings
are entitled to effective assistance of counsel.'
The standard for
establishing ineffective assistance of counsel enunciated by the court is

* Robert Latham is a Lecturer and Supervising Attorney at the Children & Youth Law
Clinic of the University of Miami School of Law. He holds bachelor degrees in
Computer Science and Linguistics from the University of Texas, and a J.D. from the
University of Michigan. Mr. Latham extends his heartfelt thanks to his research
assistant Elizabeth Henriques for her help and support, and to Betsy Dobbins, Dara
Vick, and the Florida Coastal Law Review for their continued dedication to Florida's
children. Mr. Latham is especially grateful to Robin Rosenberg for her constant
mentorship and guidance.
** Robin L. Rosenberg is the Deputy Director of Florida's Children First, an advocacy
organization dedicated to advancing the rights of Florida's children. She holds a B.S.
from Northwestern University and a J.D. from the University of Florida College of
Law. She thanks Robert Latham for his tremendous work in bringing this article to
fruition. She dedicates this article to the children and parents who suffer when the
child welfare system fails them and hopes that readers will endeavor to help the
system do better.

I J.B. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Families, 170 So. 3d 780, 796 (Fla. 2015).
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very strict and the procedure is very difficult. The standard requires
that the parent bring a pro se motion proving that the attorney's conduct
was not only deficient by professional standards under a "totality of the
circumstances" analysis, but also that the attorney's conduct was the
"but-for" cause of the termination of parental rights-and all within
twenty days. 2
Florida's child welfare advocates have long debated what the
standard and procedure for effective assistance for parents should be.
That debate focused heavily on whether the claim must be brought on
the face of the record, through a special writ, or on direct appeal. Some
energy was spent on the wording of the standard itself, mostly with an
eye toward avoiding the morass of litigation that ineffective assistance
claims cause in criminal cases. But the questions of what effective
assistance in dependency cases substantively is, how it differs from
criminal and civil cases, and how it would or would not improve the
child welfare system were largely and perhaps strategically left for
another day. Decades of writings by criminal law scholars show that
effective assistance doctrines do not raise the bar
on quality
representation-they only mark the floor, and poorly. 3 The Florida
Supreme Court, explicitly not adopting the Strickland v. Washington
standard for termination cases,4 did so primarily to avoid the difficulties
that standard brings.5
Instead, a new jurisprudence of effective
assistance would be created in Florida, specifically for dependency

2 Id.

at 793-94.

See, e.g., Martin C. Calhoun, How to Thread the Needle: Toward A Checklist-Based
Standardfor Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO. L.J. 413,
421 (1988); Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Dreaming of Effective Assistance: The
Awakening of Cronic's Call to Presume Prejudicefrom RepresentationalAbsence, 76
TEMP. L. REV. 827, 839 (2003).
3

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984), superseded by statute,
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214, as recognized in United States v. Williams, No. 2:12-CR-162-TFM, 2015 WL
4255574, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 14, 2015) ("[U]nder Strickland, a defendant 'must
establish that (1) the performance of counsel fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness; and, (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense.").
5 lB., 170 So. 3d at 792 (stating that the Florida Supreme Court does not find it
"appropriate simply to transplant Strickland and the body of case law that it has
spawned into the TPR context.").
4
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cases. 6
That goal may be in vain, however, without sufficient attention
to what the professional standards for parent representation are and
should be. This Article presents what may be the first review of
Florida's particular representation system with its mixed appointment
models and billing systems. Its findings lead to questions concerning
not only the current system of parents' representation, but also certain
procedural and substantive child welfare doctrines that appear to
undermine the best interests of children by penalizing their parents for
active participation in their cases.
This Article presents examples of active and engaged parents
represented by equally active attorneys, significantly contributing to
positive outcomes for children. These examples suggest that a key
measure of quality of representation is how effectively the attorney
contributes to the meaningful participation of the client-parent, State,
child, or Guardian ad Litem alike-in furthering the well-being of the
child. Unlike criminal cases, where a quality defense may reasonably
involve shielding a client from the case completely, the hallmark of
quality representation in child welfare cases is often engagement.7
The cases reviewed in this Article show that attorney
engagement, and therefore quality of representation for parents in
6 Id. at 793 (finding that the Strickland standard "requires a showing of prejudice that

goes beyond" an assertion that "confidence in the outcome is undermined.").
I See Kathleen A. Bailie, The Other "Neglected" Parties in Child Protective
Proceedings: Parents in Poverty and the Role of the Lawyers Who Represent Them,
66 FORDHAM L. REv. 2285, 2285 (1998). The goal of engagement is not new. See,
e.g., Clare Huntington, Missing Parents, 42 FAM. L.Q. 131, 135 (2008) [hereinafter
Huntington, Missing Parents]; Clare Huntington, Mutual Dependency in Child
Welfare, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1485, 1485-87 (2007) [hereinafter Huntington,
Mutual Dependency] (discussing another view of a child welfare system that
maximizes engagement); Elizabeth Thornton, Tools for Evaluating Parent Attorney
Performance, 29 CHILD L. PRAc. 81, 87-89 (2010) (providing a summary of attorney
quality surveys); Steve M. Wood & Jesse R. Russell, Effects of Parentaland Attorney
Involvement on Reunification in Juvenile Dependency Cases, 33 CHILD. & YOUTH
SERVS. REV. 1730, 1730-41 (2011) (discussing the effects of parental and attorney
involvement on reunification in juvenile dependency cases and finding that parental
participation in court has significant impact on reunification rates and permanency
outcomes).
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Florida, varies greatly.8 The cases also show that quality is not solely a
product of funding.9 Certainly, funding in the criminal and child
welfare context has never been sufficient, but Florida's court-appointed
attorneys in fact have no fee cap, are free to decline appointments, and
can liberally retain experts to assist in their cases.o Florida's courtappointed attorneys, moreover, can bill at either a flat rate or an hourly
rate if the flat rate is confiscatory." The idea that quality is solely a
product of absolute funding is, therefore, compelling but incomplete.
The vast majority of attorneys for parents in Florida do not bill
at the hourly rate and do not retain support experts, even though doing
so would potentially result in higher pay, lower caseloads, and the
opportunity to perform higher quality work.1 2 It is improbable that
hundreds of unrelated attorneys across a large, populous state are
graciously volunteering their time in child welfare courts because they
would prefer not to fill out invoices. Therefore, one must assume that
these attorneys feel as though they are being paid fairly for their work
and feel as though they are performing their duties ethically; therefore,
they see no reason to bill beyond the flat rate. Yet, it appears almost
impossible to fully handle a child welfare case in the number of hours
the flat rate is modeled on.
This Article concerns this curious, nearly universal complacency
of parents' attorneys with a system almost guaranteed to underpay
them.1 3 Instead of being the result of professional failings, this Article
suggests that this apparent low-quality representation may actually be a
rational strategic response to the tension between attorney funding
policies that center on litigation and the legal doctrines that penalize a
parent who resists the State's intervention. 14 Parents' attorneys may
actually be performing work at the maximum level of engagement they
8 See infra Part III.

9 See, e.g., Susan Calkins, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Parental-Rights
Termination Cases: The Challengefor Appellate Courts, 6 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS

179, 184 (2004).
10 See infra Part II.
" See infra Section IV.C.

12 See infra Part II.
' See infra Part 1I.
14 See Calkins, supra note 9, at 207-12.
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believe is tolerated by child welfare law and procedures.' 5 This Article
suggests that low-quality representation-defined as a low level of
lawyer engagement and parent participation-is a predictable outcome
of the policy decisions that courts and the legislature have made in the
development of child welfare doctrines.
While Florida's effective assistance standard applies only to
termination cases, the majority of termination cases begin as
dependency proceedings. The most common ground for termination of
parental rights is the parents' compliance or noncompliance with a
performance agreement during the dependency phase. And most cases
never proceed to termination at all. Far from the stories of egregious
abuse and murder that scream across headlines, most families in the
child welfare system have complex, but cognizable, problems and a
severe lack of material and social resources to help them through the
system.1 6 Effective assistance of counsel should extend to assisting a
parent to avoid a termination proceeding, not just litigating once one is
commenced, and it should apply to dependency proceedings even when
termination is not threatened. Our focus, therefore, is on this vast
majority of families in the system for whom a termination of parental
rights petition is not initially filed and on the acts of their attorneys that
make them more or less likely to be subject to a termination proceeding.
First, this Article will analyze billing data held by the state
agency responsible for paying parents' attorneys. This data will show a
dwindling and somewhat aging population of parents' attorneys, a
surprising lack of hourly billing, and a counterintuitive relationship
between fee caps and representation cost. Next, this Article will look at
case studies drawn from twenty invoices to show the wide range of
strategies and behaviors attorneys have actually implemented in child
welfare cases.
Far from finding passive participants or active
confounders, the case studies show that many parents and their
attorneys attempt to promote children's well-being with the limited
tools the law provides. However, not all attorney behaviors were
positive. Third, this Article will outline certain child welfare doctrines
See infra Section V.B.
16 See Cynthia Godsoe, Parsing Parenthood, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 113, 136
(2013) (discussing the "blame frame" under which parents are viewed in the child
welfare system).
15
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that explain the problematic behaviors and find policies that were
intended to promote children's best interests may actually be
counterproductive in practice. Finally, this Article will bring the data
and the doctrines together to outline the considerations that go into
effective representation of parents in the child welfare system, critique
this model, and offer suggestions to move the legal components of
Florida's child welfare system forward.
II.

BILLING RECORDS OF PARENTS' ATTORNEYS: 2007-2014

This Part explores the idea that funding is the primary predictor
of attorney engagement by examining the billing records of Florida
attorneys for parents between 2007 and 2014.
The Justice
Administrative Commission, the agency responsible for payment to
court-appointed attorneys, produced the records under Florida's broad
public records law.1 7 After removing irrelevant items, the records
consisted of 130,553 paid invoices to 839 parents' attorneys between
January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2014.18
Florida's flat-rate system compensates parents' attorneys as
follows: an attorney may bill for $800 payable after an adjudication of
dependency, then $200 for each additional year the case is open; or
$1000 for appointment to a termination of parental rights case, and then
$200 for each additional year of that proceeding.1 9 Payment is made
per client, irrespective of the number of children or number of cases the
client has open. 20 The Florida Supreme Court, beginning in 1986, has
issued a series of opinions explaining the ability of courts to award fees
above the statutory caps when the caps would be confiscatory of the
FLA. STAT. § 27.40(7)(b)(1) (2014). Due to variations in the billing practices of the
attorneys, caution when interpreting the data is warranted. Robert Latham & Robin
Rosenberg, Justice Administrative Commission: Invoice Billing Data (June 17, 2015)
[hereinafter Justice Administrative Commission] (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with authors). This study considered only those invoices that were actually paid by
the Justice Administrative Commission, on the assumption that the Justice
Administrative Commission's internal quality review mechanisms would provide
some level of data verification. Id.
'"Justice Administrative Commission, supra note 17.
' The current rates have been in effect since 2008, and they are current as of 2015.
See General Appropriations Act 2015-2016, ch. 2015-232, § 4, 2015 Fla. Laws 1, 142;
General Appropriations Act 2008-2009, ch. 2008-152, § 4, 2008 Fla. Laws 1, 133.
20 § 4, 2008 Fla. Laws at 132.
17
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attorney's time. 2 1 In determining whether a case is extraordinary, courts
are to focus on the amount of time required for the case and not on
whether the case is factually or procedurally complex. 2 2
In
extraordinary cases, attorneys contractually agree to seek no more than
an hourly rate of $75 per hour. 2 3
This low rate of compensation may contribute to the first notable
feature in our dataset: the high attrition rate for attorneys who represent
parents. In our dataset, 170 attorneys, or 20.3%, billed during only one
calendar year, while 51 attorneys submitted only one invoice in total.
Only 181 attorneys, or 21.6%, participated in the registry for the full 8
years under review.
By comparing attorneys' first recorded
appointment order with their last appointment order, the longest
practicing parents' attorney appears to have over 20 years of experience
representing parents, but the median span of appointments among all
attorneys was only 3.33 years. For the 20 attorneys who submitted the
most invoices in our eight-year period, the median year of admission to
the bar was 1996. For the 20 attorneys who submitted the most invoices
in 2014, the median year of admission was even lower in 1990. The
pool of attorneys has also shrunk, with the number of attorneys who
filed an invoice in each year steadily decreasing from a high of 505
attorneys in 2008 to 397 in 2014.
Compensation for individual attorneys was much lower than
expected. The median yearly amount invoiced per attorney ranged from
a high of $24,700 in 2008 to $14,348 in 2010. The amount had risen to
$19,392 as of 2014. Of the 181 attorneys who appeared throughout the
entire 8 years under review, their average yearly invoices ranged from
$5,490 to $112,185. Notably, only 31 attorneys in that group averaged
over $65,000 per year.
Total state expenditures on attorneys' fees varied from $11.8
million in 2007 to a low of $10.3 million in 2010 and a rise again to
$12.3 million in 2014. It appears the variation in yearly expenditures is
largely explained by the ever-changing size of the foster care population
21 Makemson v. Martin Cty., 491 So. 2d 1109, 1115 (Fla. 1986).
22 Id. at 1114.
23 Agreement for Attorney Services for the Judicial Circuit(s) (Fiscal Year 2015-

17 (July
1, 2005),
ADMIN.
2016), JUST.
court-appcounsel/contracts/2015-2016/Draft.pdf.

https://www.justiceadmin.org/
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in Florida. After eliminating seasonal factors, monthly variations in the
invoice amounts that are found year-to-year, expenditures on attorneys'
fees and the total number of children in out-of-home care were very
strongly correlated-with a correlation coefficient of 0.918.
The Justice Administrative Commission began coding invoices
as either flat fee or hourly in 2011. Since that time, only 12.42% of
attorney fee expenditures have been for hourly rate cases. The amount
has increased from 6.84% in 2011 to 14.99% in 2014. It is possible to
estimate the percentage of hourly invoices over the full 2007-2014
period by looking at the number of invoices billed for one of the flatrate billing amounts. During that time period, 49% of invoices were
billed for $800, 20% for $200, and 16% for $1,000-a total of 84% of
invoices were submitted at a flat rate amount. Another 7% of invoices
were billed for amounts that could be explained by the penalties
assessed for late submission of paperwork and other less frequently
used payment categories.
This leaves only 9% of invoices with
amounts suggestive of hourly billing.
There was wide variation in the percentage of hourly fees by
judicial district, ranging from 0.57% of expenditures in the First District
(Northwest Region) to 55.85% in the Third District (Southern Region).
Notably, the Third District was the lowest compensated district for
much of 2009-2012 and more-or-less equal with three of the other
districts in 2014. To account for differences in the size of the child
welfare system in each district, calculating attorneys' fees expenditures
per child in out-of-home care shows an even greater disparity. In 2014,
the district that utilized hourly billing the least compensated its
attorneys 56% more per child than the district that utilized hourly
billing the most and 129% more per child than the district with the
second-most number of hourly invoices.
Only 99 attorneys have filed an hourly invoice over the 4 years
since the State began tracking them. Among these attorneys, the
median annual amount billed hourly has steadily increased from $6,985
in 2010 to $29,412 in 2014. Only 30 attorneys billed hourly across all
four years under review.
Among that subset, the average hourly
amounts invoiced ranged from $4,002 to $77,362 per year. Adding in
those attorneys' flat-fee invoices results in average billings ranging
from $24,602 to $105,426 per year. Again, only 11 of the attorneys
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who regularly billed hourly were able to average above $65,000 per
year from 2011 to 2014.
From this data, the typical parent's attorney, therefore, appears
to be older and more experienced, not in the exclusive business of
representing parents in dependency cases or not doing it "for the
money," and not particularly interested in or aware of their right to bill
hourly. A core group of attorneys, perhaps as few as thirty in the whole
state, appear to be full-time parents' attorneys. Eleven of those are in
the same district. Counterintuitively, districts that have a higher rate of
billing hourly and above the statutory caps expended significantly less
per child on parent representation.
The aggregate data, however, provides little insight on the
quality or even behaviors of parents' attorneys in typical cases-a
necessary guidepost for developing professional standards. The flat-fee
system trades useful information away in exchange for easy billing.
Therefore, in Part II we investigate billing invoices from twenty
randomly selected cases that were billed as "extraordinary."
By
understanding what is extraordinary, we gain some insight into what
strategies and behaviors parents' attorneys might ordinarily undertake.
III.

CASE STUDIES

Of the approximately 1,400 hourly invoices filed in Florida
during the review period, twenty cases handled by fourteen attorneys
were randomly selected.2 4 Two of the attorneys handled three cases in
the set; two handled two cases; and the remaining ten handled just one.
The time billed ranged from 21.93 to 209.6 hours. The span of days
billed for ranged from 17 to 3,750 days. None of these cases involved
egregious facts. All of them had a dependency phase, while some
closed out in reunification, others closed out in permanent guardianship,
and others went to termination. Two went on appeal, with one reversal
and one affirmance. What makes these cases available for review is the
fact that the attorneys who handled them chose to bill hourly instead of
accepting the flat rate. There is a selection bias inherent in that fact, but
Robert Latham & Robin Rosenberg, Overview of Case Studies (June 17, 2015)
[hereinafter Overview of Case Studies] (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
authors).
24
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that bias does not invalidate the project of documenting actual
lawyering styles and strategies under the current legal regimes
described above. 25 The fact that some of these attorneys took no
documented actions outside of court and their cases were still
determined to be "extraordinary" is telling.
To document attorney behavior, each billing invoice was coded
using six categories, which were chosen through a review of the
common billing categories found across all invoices.2 6 The categories
were Researching, Reading, Court Hearings, Drafting, Communicating,
and Administrative. Object codes 27 were assigned to describe the
attorney's action in more detail-for example, the type of hearing the
attorney attended or the type of document the attorney drafted.
Supporting documentation for each billing invoice was reviewed to
learn the background and narrative of the case. 2 8
Patterns easily emerged based on the billing categories above.
An attorney's actions on a given case could be described first as either
proactive or reactive. Proactive attorneys took affirmative steps both in
and out of court on behalf of their clients. Reactive attorneys, on the
other hand, tended to respond to the actions of other parties or the court,
if at all. Attorneys further adopted a multitude of strategies, including
litigation, negotiation, counseling, and monitoring (ensuring the parent
and State were complying with the performance agreement). Notably,
in this limited dataset, litigation appeared to have the least success.
Two case studies are detailed in Sections II.A and II.B as an example.
25 See infra Part V.
26 See, e.g., Overview of Case Studies, supra note 24.

27 See, e.g., id. Attorneys are not permitted to bill for administrative functions, so this
last category consisted mostly of the Justice Administrative Commission's annotations
indicating that an entry was not billable.
28 See generally id. (showing the relative frequency of each case throughout its
disposition, as well as the circumstances surrounding each case). The supporting

documentation included with the billing invoices varied greatly by attorney. Some
attorneys attached detailed docket notes while others only attached printouts of
hearing dates. A few attorneys attached adjudicatory orders with detailed findings.
While the documents were all redacted, it was possible without any significant
deduction to decipher the general narrative of most of the cases. Due to the sensitive
nature of the documents we have chosen to publish only the general case studies
focusing on the attorney, not the families.
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Case 15889

Narrative

1.

The mother in this case was under a probate guardianship and
had a "serious mental health condition" that interfered with her ability
to care for her new infant. The father of the child was the mother's fulltime caregiver, which made it difficult for him to care for the infant as
well. The infant was sheltered at five days old and placed in a medical
foster home with foster parents who were also the adoptive parents of
the mother's older child.
Over the next months, the billing attorney engaged in a great
deal of communication with the attorneys for the other parties and
especially with an attorney retained by the foster parents. The billing
attorney promoted the client's right to participate in the child's life by
filing multiple motions, including motions for parental visitation,
participation in medical appointments, and sibling visitation.
The
billing attorney then engaged in negotiations with the foster parents
regarding an open adoption. The attorney researched the adoption
statute to effectuate contact and visitation for her client with the child
after adoption.
The case concluded with the parents entering surrenders so that
the foster parents could adopt. Concurrently, the parties entered into an
agreement for post-adoption communication that would allow the birth
parents to continue to have a relationship with their child after the
adoption.
2.

Comments

By the numbers, this attorney adopted a proactive negotiation
The attorney spent a significant percentage of time
strategy. 2 9
discussing the case with the parties and service providers and then
consistently communicated what she learned with her client. 3 0 The
billing attorney brought issues before the court through both motions
and objections. 3 1 The case reached a notably speedy resolution in under
29
30
31

Id.
Id.
Id.
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eight months. 32
3.

Breakdown of Effort

The attorney spent 34.5% of her time communicating with the
client and other parties, 30.7% of her time reading documents, and only
15.3% of her time in hearings. Additionally, the attorney only spent
11.6% of her time drafting motions and 10.8% of her time researching.
She spent a total of 56.7 hours working on this case over a span of 224
days. Therefore, her work rate totaled only 0.253 hours per day.
B.
1.

Case 15200

Narrative

The State brought a dependency petition against two parents
after one of their children was a victim of sexual assault by a minor
family member. There was no indication that the parents knew about
the assault at the time it happened; but, when the family member was
arrested, the parents declined to press charges. During the police
interview, one parent was said to have made excuses for the abuse and
had not sought professional help for the victim child's subsequent selfinjurious behavior.
The parents' two children were sheltered in March of that year.
In month two, the court accepted a case plan. The parents were assigned
tasks of individual therapy and therapy for families of sexually abused
children. By month four, the mother still had not received services from
the State. According to a notation this was "because she speaks
Spanish." In month seven, seven months after the children were
sheltered, a case note indicated that the case plan still needed to be
translated into Spanish. In month eight, the parents were still not
enrolled in individual therapy. For reasons that are not documented, the
father's counsel then asked to be discharged. It is the replacement
counsel's time records that are available for review.
Every court finding concerning compliance with the case plan
found the parents in partial compliance, meaning the parents were
active but not yet ready to safely regain custody. The court consistently
32 Id.
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found the Department of Children and Families in full compliance,
despite the fact that appropriate referrals had not been made. The
replacement counsel's billing records did not document any activity
directed at helping the father obtain the services that he needed. No
motions were filed and no communications were attempted with service
providers, case managers, or anyone other than the client. Counsel,
who had been appointed in month eight, recorded no activities on the
case in months nine through eleven until just prior to a hearing for
judicial review and case planning. The attorney then had no recorded
activities until month eighteen, again right before the next hearing.
It was not until month eighteen-seventeen months after the
case plan required therapy and eleven months after the replacement
counsel was appointed-that the case notes finally indicated that the
parents were in therapy related to their child's sexual abuse. The next
month's notes said the parents were in a parenting class, but not
individual and family therapy. The notes also added that the "parents
completed all the services but have to restart because they didn't gain
any knowledge." There is no notation of either parent ever being in full
compliance or when the children went home, but the case seems to have
closed in reunification during month twenty-three without further
description in the records.
2.

Comments

This attorney adopted a reactive monitoring strategy to the
apparent detriment of the client.33 Almost all of the attorney's efforts
were spent reviewing documents and appearing in statutorily required
court hearings. 3 4 Notably, this is the lowest effort rate in our set,
despite a client with clearly documented advocacy needs.3 5 The parents
appear to have participated in everything asked of them, even when it
would not help, and went as far as attending a parenting class in a
language they did not speak.36 The limited records obtained revealed no
proactive efforts by the parents' attorney to secure appropriate services

33
34

Id.
Id.

3 Id.
36 Id.
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for the clients for two years.3 7
3.

Breakdown of Effort

The attorney spent 23% of the time communicating with the
client and other parties, 29.8% of the time reading documents, and
43.3% of the time in hearings. However, the attorney only spent 1.1%
of the time drafting motions, 2.6% of the time preparing for hearings,
and no time researching. The attorney spent a total of 33.7 hours
working on this case over a span of 488 days. Therefore, the attorney's
work rate totaled only 0.069 hours per day.
C.

Summary of Case Studies

Most attorneys in the case studies predominantly adopted a
strategy of monitoring their client's compliance with the performance
agreement. For all the attorneys, a large amount of time was spent
reviewing reports and documents (33.35% of total hours billed) and
then attending judicial review, permanency, or status hearings (41.53%
of total hours billed). In all of the cases in the dataset, nearly the only
time every party was in the same room was in court. Billing for
participation in an out-of-court case conference (or "staffing," as they
are referred to in Florida) amounted to only 0.7% of the time billed in
this limited dataset.
Attorneys who adopted a monitoring strategy could further be
divided into two types: reactive and proactive. Reactive attorneys
reviewed reports and attended hearings, but appeared to take few
affirmative actions on the case outside of court, unless in response to
another party or the court. In contrast, proactive attorneys affirmatively
reached out to service providers, custodians, and other participants to
further their client's positions. Proactive attorneys also filed motions to
keep cases moving forward, even in cases where their client's chances
of full reunification appeared slim. The differences and effects in
litigation styles could be seen both when a parent was and was not
seeking reunification.
It is also sometimes possible to see from the billing records the

n Id.
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strategies that parents adopted vis-A-vis their attorneys. In cases where
parents with reactive attorneys were seeking reunification, the parents'
main strategy was strict adherence to their case plan and limited
reliance on legal advocacy or negotiation. Strict case plan adherence,
however, sometimes resulted in the problems predicted above. For
example, in the case of the parents who attended parenting classes
taught in a language they did not speak, the docket notes show that the
parents attended dutifully but were unsuccessfully discharged due to
"lack of progress." The reactive attorney in that case actually spent a
large portion of time-16.18% of total hours on the casecommunicating with the client, but took no apparent actions outside of
regularly scheduled court hearings to secure appropriate services. It is
not clear from the records when the client disclosed the language issue
or whether the attorney chose not to raise the issue earlier as a strategic
decision or just as part of the attorney's reactive style. Whatever the
reason, the case eventually ended with apparent reunification after being
open for two years.
In contrast, one proactive attorney's client enrolled in a
substance abuse program in the middle of a termination of parental
rights trial. The client's good progress created a basis for the attorney
to file motions with supporting witnesses for expanded visitation,
dismissal of the termination petition, and eventual reunification. On a
different case, a proactive attorney of an uncharged parent maintained
close contact with the child's therapist and drafted motions to limit
contact with the charged parent for the child's protection. The attorney
later negotiated a visitation agreement, researched how to close a case
over the other parent's objection, and moved the court to terminate
supervision with the child in his client's custody.
Not all proactive attorneys were successful for their client, and
not all clients accepted their attorney's advice. In one case, a mother
with severe mental health issues appears to have insisted on a strategy
of both aggressive litigation and strict adherence to her performance
agreement. The attorney was proactive, diligently researching the legal
The mother
issues surrounding a parent with severe disabilities.
dependency
took
both
the
attended every service required of her and
and the termination petitions to trial, all without success. After the
termination trial, the attorney also handled the appeal, which resulted in
an affirmance after a motion for extension of time filed by the State.
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The case ultimately took just over two and a half years to resolve, with
the child safely in a pre-adoptive foster home. The attorney was able to
negotiate and obtain an order allowing continued contact between the
mother and the child pending the adoption. 3 8
In several cases the attorney's client was not seeking
reunification at all. Those cases are instructive of what a "minimal
effort" case might look like. When the attorney was reactive, the
percentage of time spent in court and reading documents was almost the
entirety of the attorney's efforts: 93.64% in the case of a client who
was in agreement with a permanent guardianship and 91.98% in the
case of a client who took no steps towards reunification when the other
parent successfully reunified. In another case, once the client agreed
with the permanent guardianship, the attorney took no further actions,
though the case would not close for another eight months. The reactive
attorneys appear to have contributed nothing to the proceedings.
On the contrary, even in cases where the parent was not seeking
reunification, proactive attorneys still had a productive role. In a case
with the proactive attorney of a legal father who sought to disestablish
paternity, the attorney expeditiously researched the issue, drafted the
paperwork, and had the legal father dismissed within seventeen days so
that the biological father of the child could be recognized. A reactive
attorney in the same position may have instead waited for the State to
file a termination petition against their client. In the case described
above involving parents with disabilities and a foster parent who had
adopted the parents' previous child, the proactive attorney sought
expanded visitation rights for her clients while simultaneously
negotiating post-adoption contact in return for the client surrendering
his rights. That case closed in eight months.
A minority of attorneys in our selection adopted a purely
litigation-based strategy aimed at intensive legal advocacy during the
adjudicatory trials and little else. None of the trial-based litigation
resolved in favor of the parents. One attorney obtained a reversal on

Id. It is hard not to compare this case with the other case study in which the parents
had a positive relationship with the pre-adoptive parent and the case closed in eight
months. Is the recruitment of strangers to adopt a child a source of delayed
permanency?
38
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appeal based on improper reliance on hearsay, but lost again on retrial.
That attorney, who had spent much effort litigating, subsequently took
no affirmative steps outside of court, and the case eventually closed in a
permanent guardianship.
Despite being favored under the flat-fee
structure, trial-based litigation was the least effective advocacy strategy
present in these case studies.
Notably, even in cases that centered on litigation, none of the
attorneys in our selection appear to have utilized experts that had not
been provided by the State. This is true across the reviewed billing
data: only $366,120 or 0.38% of all expenditures were for medical or
mental health evaluations. Compared to 101,298 invoices for attorneys'
fees, independent evaluations were invoiced just 624 times-and 373 of
those invoices came out of just two circuits. It seems that parents'
attorneys rely almost completely on the State's experts.
Some cases did not focus on the parents at all. These cases
invested a great amount of resources from all parties and the courts in
monitoring the children or the custodians. In one such case, the parent
agreed to a permanent guardianship in month eight, but the case
remained open for another eight months while the court determined
whether the custodian could care for the child's medical needs. In
another case, there was significant litigation surrounding the child's
placement, psychotropic medication, and participation in a summer
program. In yet another case, the main litigation issue appears to have
been a high-conflict custody battle between the maternal and paternal
side of the family, with custodians being ordered out of their own
houses and into services. 3 9
Finally, one contentious domestic violence case arising out of a
divorce is telling of how the temperament of a judge can affect the
shape of a child welfare case. In that case, both parents appeared to
have proactive attorneys who maintained contact with the custodians
and service providers and filed affirmative motions for both expanded

11 Id. Florida courts have issued conflicting rulings on whether nonparties even have
the right to appeal, leaving the trial courts' ruling even further insulated from review.
See, e.g., In re K.M., 978 So. 2d 211, 213 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); C.M. v. Dep't of
Children & Families, 981 So. 2d 1272, 1272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); In re C.G.,
612 So. 2d 602, 603 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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rights of their clients and the protection of the children. The judge, it
seems, also took an aggressive position on the case, at one point
ordering State attorneys from another county to be present. At another
point the judge ordered the Department of Children and Families and all
attorneys and parties involved to produce all e-mails and
correspondence on the case. The court issued detailed orders-down to
how the children were to be dressed for visits with a parent in jail-and
denied multiple motions for termination of supervision. The case was
in the system for six years and ended anticlimactically with sole custody
for one parent and visitation for the other.
It was apparent in this randomly selected set of cases that many
parents and their attorneys were far from passive recipients of services
or impediments to the well-being of children. Instead, many parents
were actively engaged in advocacy using the limited tools the legal
system had provided. The fact that attorneys appeared more active
when their clients were not seeking reunification or when termination
was seemingly inevitable is suggestive of a participation penalty,
similar to the trial penalty found in criminal cases, that discourages
active engagement by parents. What is also apparent is that it is hard to
imagine many cases-and certainly not 91% of cases-being handled in
fewer hours than many of these. This raises serious questions about the
level of involvement attorneys have in flat fee cases. To help explain
why such unexpected behavior occurs, the next Part explores the one
thing all of these cases have in common: the law of the child welfare
system.
IV.

THE PROBLEMATIC STRUCTURES OF CHILD WELFARE LAW

Noticeable in the case studies are two problematic structures of
child welfare law that rarely find voice in appellate opinions: punitive
proceduralization, where parents are held to procedural compliance
standards with grossly disproportionate substantive consequences and
the lack of accountability mechanisms available to non-State parties to
ensure the State is upholding its obligations to the family. The next
Section shows how the convergence of these two features, along with
the flat-rate payment model's emphasis on trial-based litigation,
possibly explains the low-engagement behavior seen in the case studies
and aggregate data.
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Punitive Proceduralization

The history of Florida's modem procedural framework can be
traced to the 1980s and the introduction of performance agreements as
the organizing principle of child welfare policy. 4 0
Early courts
struggled with the application of performance agreements. One district
court in 1983 wrote that the question of when a performance agreement
was in the child's best interest required "more wisdom than Solomon[]"
and held that performance agreements would therefore be required in all
cases. 4 1 Other district courts found performance agreements actually
violative of justice for children, with one court in 1984 commenting that
the mandatory use of performance agreements in cases where
permanent commitment was "inevitable" would produce "absurd
results."4 2 The Florida Supreme Court issued a compromise opinion,
holding that performance agreements were statutorily required but that
the goal of the agreement need not be reunification. 4 3
This policy debate is traditionally framed as one of protection of
children versus preservation of families, or the "pendulum" of child
welfare.4 4 The debate normally invokes discussions of the threshold of
40 See, e.g., In re A.B., 444 So. 2d 981, 995 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
41 Id. at 993-94.

That same year, scholars were debating whether termination of
parental rights for mere case plan noncompliance was even in children's best interests.
See Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate ParentalRights?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 423, 423-25

(1983).
42

In re C.B., 453 So. 2d 220, 222 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), quashed sub nom. Burk

v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 476 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 1985).

&

43 See generally Gerry v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 476 So. 2d 1279, 1280
(Fla. 1985) (holding that a performance agreement should be prepared regardless of
the permanency commitment and termination of parental rights hearing even if the
child will not be placed with the biological parents); Burk, 476 So. 2d at 1278 (holding
that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services must "offer a performance
agreement to a natural parent before terminating parental rights").
44 See, e.g., John T. Halloran, FamiliesFirst: Reframing ParentalRights As Familial
Rights in Termination of ParentalRights Proceedings, 18 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L.
POL'Y 51, 80-81 (2014); Virginia S. Radding, Intention v. Implementation: Are Many
Children, Removed from Their Biological Families, Being Protectedor Deprived?, 6
U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 29, 37 (2001); Catherine J. Ross, The Tyranny of Time:
Vulnerable Children, "Bad" Mothers, and Statutory Deadlines in Parental
Termination Proceedings, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 176, 194 (2004). More modem
views of child welfare and social work assert that the protection of children and the
preservation of their families are not competing goals at all. Patricia A. Schene, Past,
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harm required to remove a child and the length of time that is
reasonable for a parent to "rehabilitate." 4 5
By the mid-1980s, the two policy positions were clearly
articulated in Florida law. 4 6 In 1986, a district court of appeal found
that performance agreements were subject to the "whims and caprices
of the individual social worker who drafts them."4 7 The court
consequently ruled performance agreements facially unconstitutional
delegations of legislative power. 48 Permanent commitment, the court
held, was constitutional only if based on abuse, abandonment, or
neglect; the constitution requires harm to the child, not the failure of
parents to comply with arbitrary requirements. 49 The Florida Supreme
Court unanimously affirmed the decision in the late summer of that
year.5 0

In an apparent attempt to sidestep the Florida Supreme Court's
ruling, the Florida Legislature statutorily defined failure of a parent to
comply with the performance agreement itself to constitute evidence of
abuse, abandonment, or neglect.' It was, and still is, a pure legal
fiction: a parent alleged to have physically abused his child is treated as
continuing to abuse his child until he completes a required anger
management course-even if he never harms his child again.5 2

Present, and Future Roles of Child Protective Services, 8 FUTURE CHILD., Spring
1998, at 23, 29-30, https://www.princeton.edu/futureofchildren/publications/docs/
08_01_0l.pdf.
Unfortunately, much of child welfare legal doctrine has not
incorporated these newer views. Id.
45 Radding, supra note 44, at 32.
46 Compare FLA. STAT. § 39.521(f)(1) (2012) (finding that the Department of Children
and Families must utilize "reasonable efforts by way of "reasonable diligence and
care" when attempting to reunify families), with FLA. STAT. § 39.806 (2014) (finding
that the best interest of the child takes precedence over familiar reunification under
certain delimitated circumstances).
47 In re R.W., 481 So. 2d 548, 549 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986), aff'd, 495 So. 2d 133
(Fla. 1986).
48 Id. There was no comment that child welfare policy had for decades been
implemented at the pure discretion of individual judges. See id.
49 Id.

'o In re R. W., 495 So. 2d at 135.
st Id.
52

FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1) (2014).
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Almost all of Florida's child welfare jurisprudence can be traced
back to these dual doctrinal cores: the Florida Supreme Court requires
actual or imminent harm to a child before it will permit intervention into
a family's life, but the Florida Legislature insistently defines the
procedural status of a parent as equivalent to substantive harm to a
child.5 3
Overwhelmingly, most cases do not proceed to termination of
parental rights; those that do, do so only after the provision of a
performance agreement to the parent.5 4 Termination in those cases is
then based on the parent's procedural noncompliance with the terms of
the agreement, not the egregiousness of the underlying harm.5 5 The
performance agreement has thereby been elevated to the primary engine
of due process in child welfare cases, and with some exceptions, 56
courts have concurrently dismantled the traditional litigation
protections.5 7

The Florida Supreme Court has not yet revisited the question of
whether procedural noncompliance with potentially arbitrary terms of a
performance agreement is a constitutional basis for termination of
53 Id.
54

Gerry v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 476 So. 2d 1279, 1280 (Fla. 1985).

5

Id.

For example, the Florida Supreme Court has ruled strongly against the punitive use
of defaults against parents. J.B. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 768 So. 2d
1060, 1066-69 (Fla. 2000).
57 See, e.g., Fla. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. P.E., 14 So. 3d 228, 236 (Fla.
2009) (eliminating the need for any substantive offer of proof of the underlying
grounds when a parent defaults in a termination of parental rights case); S.B. v. Dep't
of Children & Families, 851 So. 2d 689, 694 (Fla. 2003) (declining to recognize
ineffective assistance of counsel claims in dependency matters); N.S.H. v. Fla. Dep't
of Children & Family Servs., 843 So. 2d 898, 904 (Fla. 2003) (declining to extend
Anders procedures to child welfare cases); Nat. Parents of J.B. v. Fla. Dep't of
Children & Family Servs., 780 So. 2d 6, 11 (Fla. 2001) (finding that there was no
constitutional requirement that termination of parental rights proceedings be open to
the public even at the parent's request); Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. M.B., 701
So. 2d 1155, 1162 (Fla. 1997) (allowing child hearsay statements to be admitted even
when inconsistent with the child's testimony at trial, if otherwise found reliable by the
trial judge); Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Honeycutt, 609 So. 2d 596, 597 (Fla.
1992) (ruling that decisions of the trial court, during the period between adjudication
and permanency, were not reviewable by direct appeal).
56
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parental rights. The result is that in many places in Florida a consent
plea to marijuana usage can legally escalate to a termination of parental
rights proceeding when a parent fails-for whatever reason-to attend
group sessions, even if the parent's original behavior was never proven
to be harmful to the child.18
B.

Lack of State Accountability

The second problematic doctrine of child welfare jurisprudence
is what Josh Gupta-Kagan has termed the "due process donut hole." 5 9
This donut hole exists in the time between an adjudication of
dependency-where a child is initially found to be abused, abandoned,
or neglected-and a permanency hearing, where a child's ultimate fate
is decided. 6 0 There are court hearings during that year, and for easy
cases, this is of little concern-the progress towards reunification and
closure of the case will likely be agreed upon by the parties. 6 1 In more
difficult cases, however, disputed positions can be hotly contested and
important to the ultimate outcome of the case. 6 2
What Professor Gupta-Kagan points out as unusual about this
portion of a case is its general lack of procedural rules typically inherent
in judicial proceedings. 6 3 In Florida, the evidentiary requirements after
the adjudicatory phase are relaxed to allow the court to consider "any
other relevant and material evidence," allowing rumors, suppositions,
and multilayered hearsay to be considered in the form of written reports,
not subject to cross-examination or needing corroboration. 6 4
Participation in a quarterly or biannual judicial review hearing is
procedurally indistinguishable from an informal status conference in

See J.E. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 126 So. 3d 424, 427 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2013).
58

* Josh Gupta-Kagan, Filling the Due Process Donut Hole: Abuse and Neglect Cases
Between Disposition and Permanency, 10 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 13, 14 (2010).
6 See id.
61 See id.; see also DONALD T. KRAMER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN § 2:18 (rev. 2d

ed. 2005).
62 See Gupta-Kagan,supra note 59, at 14-15.
63 See generally id. (demonstrating that the state lacks clarity when adopting rules that

provide procedural safeguards during the waiting period).

6 Id. at 17, 26; FLA. STAT. § 39.521(7)(t) (2015).
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Attorneys proffer evidence with no
criminal or civil cases. 65
expectation that anyone will verify it, and judges make decisions on
those proffers, up to and including the extreme decision of finding the
parent in noncompliance with the case plan and ordering the State to
seek to terminate their parental rights. 66 Although Florida has detailed
rules of juvenile procedure, it is not immune to Professor GuptaKagan's critique. Both its statutes and court rules offer significantly
weaker protections in the middle of reunification cases than are found in
adjudicatory hearings. 67 That hole has been widened even further by
being insulated from appellate review; the Florida Supreme Court ruled
early on that dependency cases do not fall within the rules authorizing
review of nonfinal orders. 68
Consequently, Florida courts have thus far issued only a handful
of opinions on performance agreements outside of the context of
termination of parental rights. 69 The holdings of those opinions can be
summarized as follows: performance agreements must be narrowly
tailored to address the "facts and circumstances" of the dependency, 70
and even uncharged parents can be ordered to complete tasks as a
Compare FRANK

L. McGUANE, JR. & KATHLEEN

A. HOGAN, COLORADO FAMILY
§ 12:9 (2d ed. 2009) (demonstrating the low requirements within
informal status conferences), with Gupta-Kagan, supra note 59, at 15-21 (discussing
the procedures and customs of permanency hearings).
66 See Gupta-Kagan, supra note 59, at 42-46, 48 (explaining that without proper
evidentiary hearings there is a high probability of erroneous deprivation of parental
rights and that courts should verify evidence offered by the parties before making such
"critically important" decisions).
67 For example, Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure 8.420(a)(3) states that case plan
tasks and goals may be amended at any time over the objection of a parent if there is a
"preponderance of the evidence demonstrating the need for the amendment," but the
rules make no reference to the quality of the evidence, the right to a hearing, or how
"the need for the amendment" should relate to the underlying adjudication of
dependency or harm to the child.
68 See Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Honeycutt, 609 So. 2d 596, 597 (Fla. 1992).
After a recent amendment to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, one district
court ruled that orders on motions that fully resolve the issues of the motion are
directly appealable. W.W. v. Guardian ad Litem Program, 159 So. 3d 999, 1000-01
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
69 See supra Section IV.A.
70 In re S.M., 136 So. 3d 1271, 1271 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014); In re G.S., 84 So. 3d
1231, 1233 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
65

LAW AND PRACTICE
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condition of custody; 7 ' a party objecting to the amendment of a
performance agreement has the right to be heard,7 2 and the amendments
cannot be based solely on hearsay; 73 but neither the court nor the parties
are bound by the case plan goal,7 4 and amendments can be made at any
hearing without prior notice.7 5 Under this regime, if a case does not
proceed to termination there is very little review of the performance
agreement's reasonableness.7 6 If a case goes to a termination trial, the
court conducts a post hoc review of the agreement as part of the
determination that the State made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the
parent. Such review occurs far too late to go back and correct any but
the most egregious errors that were made.7 8
C.

Flat-Rate Billing Policies

Uncomfortably adjoining these substantive and procedural
doctrines, the policies on attorneys' fees also threaten to undermine
parent participation in child welfare cases. By accepting appointments
for parents, attorneys agree via contract to accept a "flat rate" for their

' F.O. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 94 So. 3d 709, 710 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012);
D.M. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 807 So. 2d 90, 90-91 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2002).
72 R.H. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 948 So. 2d 898, 899-900 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2007); K.E. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 958 So. 2d 968, 973 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2007).
7 R.C. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 917 So. 2d 241, 242 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2005).
74 M.l. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 45 So. 3d 878, 882 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
7 R.N. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 25 So. 3d 697, 700 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2010).
76

See David J. Herring, Inclusion of the Reasonable Efforts Requirement in

Termination of Parental Rights Statutes: Punishingthe Childfor the Failures of the
State Child Welfare System, 54 U. PIr. L. REV. 139, 163 (1992) [hereinafter Herring,
Inclusion] (detailing reasonable efforts review).
7 CHILD WELFARE PRE-SERVICE TRAINING REMOVAL AND PLACEMENT PARTICIPANT
GUIDE
2
(2012),
http://centerforchildwelfare.fmhi.usf.edu/preservice/

participantguides/Removal%20and%20Placement%2OParticipant%2OGuide.pdf.
78 See Herring, Inclusion, supra note 76.
This has long been the critique of
incorporating reasonable efforts review into the termination of parental rights process.

Id.
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work performed on the case. 7 9 The flat-rate system permits billing at
certain intervals as follows: $800 at the conclusion of a dependency trial
or a parent's consent, $200 for each subsequent year of the case, and
$1,000 at the filing of a petition for termination of parental rights.8 0
Attorneys may bill for fees in excess of the flat rate if billing the flat
rate would be "confiscatory" of their time.8 i The flat rate is generally
considered confiscatory in a child welfare case when an attorney has
worked 21.3 hours in a dependency case or 26.6 hours in a termination
of parental rights case. 8 2 The attorney may bill at $75 per hour after
that point, meaning that an attorney who works just under the threshold
amount is compensated at the effective rate of $38 an hour. 83
There are two perceived benefits of the flat-rate system for
attorneys. The first is that they are not required to keep time records in
order to receive the flat rate. 84 Many attorneys find timekeeping
onerous, so relief from that burden has intrinsic and extrinsic value.
The second benefit lies in the ability to collect the full fee even if the
number of hours expended is minimal.
The flat fee of $800
compensates an attorney at $75 an hour for 10.67 hours of work, so a
resolution achieved in less time increases the effective compensation
rate. During the second and subsequent years of a dependency case, the
same point occurs at 2.67 hours.
It seems highly unlikely that the circumstances of most cases
would allow counsel to meet the minimal requirements of effective

See FLA. STAT. § 27.5304(6)(a) (2014).
The flat-rate compensation system
developed in the criminal defense realm when the Florida Legislature's repeated
attempts to cap attorney's fees were rebuffed by the Florida Supreme Court. Fla.
Dep't of Fin. Servs. v. Freeman, 921 So. 2d 598, 600 (Fla. 2006). The court held that
the State may not confiscate an attorney's time by refusing to provide adequate
compensation. Id. at 601.
80 § 27.5304(6)(a). Although it did not change the statute, the Legislature reduced the
General
flat rate for dependency cases from $1,000 to $800 effective 2008.
7

Appropriations Act 2008-2009, ch. 2008-152, § 4, 2008 Fla. Laws 1, 133.
Makemson v. Martin Cty., 491 So. 2d 109, 1114 (Fla. 1986).
See FLA. STAT. § 27.5304(6)(a). Multiply the flat rate times two and dividing that
number by $75 to calculate the threshold number of hours.
81

82

83

See id.

84 See id.

§ 27.40(7)(b)(1). Failure to keep contemporaneous time records constitutes a

waiver of the right to seek fees in excess of the flat rate. Id.
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representation in under three hours per year, especially during the
dependency phase.85 Under this system, attorneys who choose not to
record their time are not financially incentivized to do more than the
bare minimum for their clients, which is to appear at court hearings and
lodge oral procedural objections to the terms of the performance
agreement. 8 6 Worse still, the flat-rate system incentivizes attorneys to
allow a difficult case to proceed to the filing of a termination petition
prior to engaging in affirmative advocacy to resolve pending issues and
send the case back to the dependency phase.8 ' At $1,000, the litigation
of a termination petition is the dollar equivalent of five years of "donut
hole" work on a case.8 8 It is clear this system was created on the
assumption that an attorney's role is (or should be) primarily to litigate
in the two main adjudicatory trials. 8 9
V.

STRATEGIC BEHAVIORS OF THE PARTIES

The convergence of the legal doctrines listed above and the flat
rate billing system leads to litigation strategies that appear to risk
undermining the goal of promoting the best interests of children. This
Part sketches out the rational behavior of attorneys for the State and the
parents under these doctrines. It also discusses how the introduction of
third-party advocates, such as Guardians ad Litem, does not address the
issues raised here, which are inherent in the relationship between the

85 See

AM.

BAR Ass'N

HOUSE

OF DELEGATES,

AMERICAN

BAR ASSOCIATION

STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT IN ABUSE NEGLECT CASES

1-7
(1996),
http://www.afccnet.org/Portals/0/PublicDocuments/Guidelines/
AbuseNeglectStandards.pdf (identifying that at a minimum an attorney must review
pleadings, interview and counsel his or her her client, investigate the facts, interview
witnesses, and attend court hearings).
Pennsylvania recently undertook a
comprehensive study of the time required to represent a parent in a dependency
proceeding and allocated thirty hours to the work covered by Florida's $800 fee.
General Appropriations Act 2008-2009, ch. 2008-152, § 4, 2008 Fla. Laws 1, 133.
86 See generally AM. BAR ASS'N HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note 85 (identifying
key components of an attorney's role in representation).
87

88

Id.
See FLA.

STAT.

§ 27.5304(6)(a).

See generally AM. BAR ASS'N HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note 85, at 13 (finding
that a competent lawyer is one who is trained in representing children and "skilled in
81

litigation").
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parent and the State. 90
First, though, one additional feature of child welfare proceedings
must be considered: they move far faster than any criminal or civil
trial. 91 Even for clients or causes with nearly endless financial
resources, there is a very real limit to judicial patience and time. 92 Time
moves even more swiftly in child welfare cases where the work of early
advocates succeeded in grafting into the bones of the system the idea
that speedy "permanency," or an end to State oversight of a child, is one
correct measure of successful outcomes in the child welfare system. 93
This hurriedness, along with the features of child welfare law discussed
above, produce litigation strategies quite different from traditional
criminal and civil cases. 94
The following Section explores how rational attorneys might
conceive of their duties under the doctrinal system described above.
The result is a system in which both litigation and cooperation are not
only discouraged, but penalized. 95 Before discussing representation of
parents, however, it is useful to begin with the role of attorneys for the
State.
A.

Representing the State

Child welfare cases begin with an intake process similar to a
criminal investigation. 9 6 Florida, like many states, has a very strict

90 See Martin Guggenheim, The Importance of Family Defense, 48 FAM. L.Q. 597,

606 (2015) (discussing the role of family defense work in furthering the goals of the

child welfare system).
9 See supra Section IV.B.
92 See generally FOSTERING RESULTS,
SAFETY

&

PERMANENCY

FOR

VIEW FROM THE BENCH:
CHILDREN

IN

FOSTER

OBSTACLES TO
CARE

(2004),

http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/reports/fost
ercare-reform/fosteringresults07OlO4pdf.pdf (reporting that seventeen percent of
judges named overcrowded dockets as their number one frustration in child welfare
cases).
93 See, e.g., Herring, Inclusion, supra note 76, at 144; Radding, supra note 44, at 45.
94 See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94
Stat. 500 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
95 See id.
96 See infra Part VI.
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mandatory reporting law that applies to all persons-not just designated
professionals-and mandates a report if a person either knows of or has
"reasonable cause to suspect" child maltreatment. 9 7 The knowing and
willing failure to report child maltreatment is a third-degree felony
punishable by up to five years in state prison.9 8 Unlike police
complaints, all calls to the child abuse hotline must be investigated and
acted upon. 99 Complicating the relationship between the law and
practice, the Department of Children and Families has determined that
the incident-based analysis (defining a dependent child as one who has
suffered any of a list of enumerated harms) found in the current statutes
does not lead to an efficient use of resources for some children and
leaves other children at home with a high risk of future harm. 0 0
97

FLA. STAT.

§ 39.201(1)(a) (2014). The wisdom of such laws and their exceptions

are under constant question. See, e.g., Mary H. Mitchell, Must Clergy Tell? Child
Abuse Reporting Requirements Versus the Clergy Privilege and Free Exercise of
Religion, 71 MINN. L. REV. 723, 729 (1987); Robert P. Mosteller, Child Abuse
Reporting Laws and Attorney-Client Confidences: The Reality and the Specter of
Lawyer As Informant, 42 DUKE L.J. 203, 250 n.144 (1992); Dale Margolin Cecka,
How child abuse hotlines hurt the very children they're trying to protect, WASH. POsT
(May 6, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/05/06/howchild-abuse-hotlines-hurt-the-very-children-theyre-trying-to-protect/.
98 FLA. STAT. § 39.205.
'9

Id. § 39.301.

ioo FLA. STAT. § 39.01 (2015). Not every broken bone or bruise requires the full
arsenal of State and judicial oversight; but even without broken bones and bruises,
chronic environmental neglect may signal the need for intervention. See id. The
Department of Children and Families (like many other agencies around the nation) has
therefore adopted an actuarial decision-making methodology that assesses a child's
situational risks and the family's protective capacity in conjunction with the type of
maltreatment. Dep't of Children & Families, Office of Child Welfare, Florida Safety
Methodology, FLA. CTR. FOR CHILD WELFARE 1,
1 (Dec. 6, 2013),
http://centerforchildwelfare.fmhi.usf.edu/kb/safetymethod/SafetyMethodOverviewl26-13.pdf [hereinafter Florida Safety Methodology]. Scientific does not mean free of
bias. See generally Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific
Rationalization of Discrimination,66 STAN. L. REv. 803, 804-05 (2014) (discussing
different variables courts are using now to determine sentencing, including but not
limited to, socioeconomics impacts, gender, family, and age). Florida has been rolling
the system out incrementally since 2013. Florida Safety Methodology, supra, at 2.
The full effects of the methodology have yet to be seen, but one of the methodology's
goals is to increase the engagement and empowerment of parents in the system, a goal
that is in conflict with the more proceduralized doctrines found in current child
welfare law. Id.
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Once a case is selected for prosecution, the role of an attorney
for the Statelo' is, initially, not so different from a criminal
prosecutor.1 0 2 Like a criminal prosecutor, the State's child welfare
attorney must assess the legal merits of a case independent of the
investigation process, but the legal definition of child maltreatment
extends so broadly as to make almost any case that involves some harm
or perceived risk legally sufficient. 0 3 Additionally, the lack of any
prophylactic rules on the nature and scope of the child protective
investigation removes any consideration of how the evidence came to
be known.' 0 4 A case is weighed by its alleged facts alone, and the
preponderance standard makes a dismissal on the quality of the
evidence unlikely. 0 5
The child welfare attorney's next step is to determine whether
the case merits termination of the parents' rights.1 0 6 The Legislature has
provided Florida petitioners with approximately fourteen grounds that a
petitioner can allege in an expedited manner without first offering a
performance agreement.' 0 Choosing to file for termination of parental
rights comes with a higher evidentiary burden and a significantly more
complicated legal framework; therefore, only the most egregious or
compelling cases would likely be filed without first offering the parents

'o' See Michael J. Dale & Louis M. Reidenberg, ProvidingAttorneys for Children in

Dependency and Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings in Florida: The Issue
Updated, 35 NOVA L. REV. 301, 335 (2011).
102 See id.; see also Kate Smith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and
the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1420 (2008) [hereinafter Smith, The
Arc of the Pendulum].
103 See Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 101.
Therefore, it is subject to many of the
same critiques and calls for reform.
10 Id. at 310 ("[S]ince 2000 there has been almost no change in the system of
independent legal representation of children in child welfare proceedings in Florida.").
10 See Douglas E. Cressler, Requiring ProofBeyond a Reasonable Doubt in Parental
Rights Termination Cases, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 785, 791 (1994) (stating that
reasonable doubt is not required but a lower threshold of proof). The preponderance
burden itself is not strictly applied in practice, however, because a judge is likely to
grant the State's petition in borderline cases in order to provide an opportunity for the
State to monitor the family for at least six months.
106

See

FLA. STAT.

§ 39.802(8) (2015).

See id. § 39.802(5).
parental rights).
107

See generally id. § 39.806 (listing grounds for termination of
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a case plan, especially in light of the fact that a parent's failure to
comply with the case plan could later be an independent ground for
termination. 0 8 Noncompliance, the bureaucratic measure of lack of
progress, is much easier to prove than egregiousness of harm or futility
of services. Also, dependency cases are not backwards looking; a
parent's actions throughout the case can become evidence against
them.' 09
For cases in which a performance agreement is offered, a child
welfare petitioner's next step is to attempt to negotiate a plea." 0 All of
the criticisms of plea negotiations in the criminal context equally
apply.'"
The difference is that the child welfare petitioner's plea
negotiation tools are far more limited than those available to a criminal
prosecutor.1 1 2 There are no degrees of dependency as there are degrees
of crime.11 3 At the end of a dependency trial, a child either is or is not
adjudicated dependent.1 1 4 A petitioner could overcharge by filing a
petition for termination in hopes of negotiating a dependency, but in
most cases the facts would not support it." 5
A child welfare petitioner is also more limited in negotiating the
1s See id. § 39.802(8).
See generally id. § 39.806(f)-(n) (providing reasons for
immediate termination, including egregious behavior, murder, and conviction of
sexual assault as a type of termination without a case plan).
109 See generally id. § 39.806 (identifying reasons to terminate parental rights).
110 See generally David J. Herring, Legal Representationfor the State Child Welfare
Agency in Civil Child Protection Proceedings: A Comparative Study, 24 U. TOL. L.
REV. 603, 609-10 (1993) [hereinafter Herring, Legal Representation] (stating that the
attorney negotiates with opposing counsel to eliminate the need for trial).
." See generally Smith, The Arc of the Pendulum, supra note 102 (stating that a
prosecutor has discretion to investigate, charge, and punish, and the system needs to
be revamped).
112 See generally Herring, Legal Representation, supra note 110, at 624 (describing
how prosecuting attorneys work in narrow legalistic bounds and make decisions based
upon the evidence and confines of the law).
"I See generally § 39.806 (listing grounds for termination of parental rights). But see
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.071 (detailing the degrees of criminal charges for purposes of
preparing score sheets used as sentencing guidelines).
114 See § 39.802(6).
" See generally Herring, Legal Representation, supra note I10 (stating the petitioner
may refuse to file or "pursue petitions that were too difficult to prove in court" or file
amendments to the petition over the objection of the social worker).
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conditions of the case. 1 16 A criminal prosecutor could recommend a
lesser sentence or credit time served, but a child welfare petitioner's
negotiations are complicated because their cases are multiparty, with
usually at least five parties: the State, two parents, the child, and a
guardian ad litem-not to mention an open list of potential
"participants" that the court can hear from about the well-being of the
child." 7 Unlike criminal cases where there is a clear division of
responsibility between the prosecutor and the defense, every party in a
child welfare case has standing to prosecute the petition against a parent
or to move the court to amend the performance agreement or change the
conditions of the child's placement." 8
Furthermore, with some
limitations, judges are free to act unilaterally even if all parties agree to
a different course of action. 1 19
If a maltreatment case actually goes to trial (the reasons for why
this is unlikely will be discussed in further detail in Section IV.B), the
child welfare petitioner has several advantages over a criminal
prosecutor.1 2 0 First, most of the State's witnesses are professional
witnesses:
child abuse investigators, medical examiners, forensic
interviewers, therapists, and case managers.121 Their testimony coupled
with statements by the parent during the investigation are usually

116

Id.

117

§ 39.01(50), (51).

Multiparty litigation presents its own difficulties. See, e.g.,
Barbara Busharis, The Barnes Dilemma Resolved? The Florida Supreme Court
Requires Apportionment of All Offers to Multiple Defendants, 24 TRIAL ADVOC. Q.,
July 2005, at 6, 6, 19 http://www.fdla.org/Scripts/Members/TAQ/TAQ%20%20SUMMER%202005.pdf (describing the dilemma facing multiple defendants in
one litigation); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and the Multiparty Dispute: The
Search for Workable Solutions, 72 IOWA L. REV. 473, 480 (1987) (detailing how
courts are limited given the issue of multiple parties and complexity of third-party

ligation).
118 § 39.6013(2)(3)(a).
1" See, e.g., Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. In re J.C., 847 So. 2d 487, 490 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2002) ("Especially in the context of children, our trial courts have a
continuing responsibility to vigilantly protect the welfare and best interests of the

child.").
120 See generally Toro v. State, 642 So. 2d 78, 80, 83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(finding that the child welfare petitioner had the advantage of producing expert
testimony in the form of a psychologist).
121

Id. at 79-80, 82.
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sufficient to make a case.' 2 2 The credibility gap is stacked so clearly
against a parent that it is considered a sound strategy by many attorneys
for the State to call the parent as the first witness. 123
There is one notable way in which child welfare prosecutions
stand distinct from the criminal model the system was built on: the role
of the State's attorney changes significantly once the parent enters into
a performance agreement, and the State is obligated to provide services
and care to the family.1 24 This shift in posture morphs the attorney's
role into that of a governmental in-house counsel in charge of
compliance oversight.1 2 5 Breaches of duty by the State, both large and
small, happen at alarmingly frequent rates in child welfare cases. 126
Criminal prosecutors are not in charge of litigating jail conditions
claims or parole hearings, but child welfare prosecutors have to live
with the case they bring, sometimes for years. 127 By having to
constantly respond to challenges from the parties and the judge, the
State's attorney is put squarely on the defense. 128
The State's attorney's rational defensive strategies during this

122

D. Children v. Dep't of Children & Family Serv., 820 So. 2d 980, 984 (Fla. Dist.

Ct. App. 2002).

See id. at 981, 983, 985.
Meghan Scahill, Prosecuting Attorneys in Dependency Proceedings in Juvenile
Court: Defining and Assessing a CriticalRole in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases, 1 J.
CTR. CHILD. & CTS. 73, 76-78 (1999).
125 See id. at 83-84.
126 See JENNIFER L. RENNE, LEGAL ETHICS IN CHILD WELFARE CASES 13 (Claire
Sandt ed., 2004),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abaladministrative/
childlaw/2004_LegalEthics.authcheckdam.pdf. For example, service providers close
down and will not release reports, case managers fail to conduct visits or studies on
time, a foster parent is arrested for neglect, or no appropriate therapeutic placements
for a child can be found.
127 See id. at 53.
128 See id. 29 (stating that prosecutors must balance the interests of the parties and the
people). The role of the prosecutor in child welfare proceedings was the focus of
some study in the 1990s. See Herring, Legal Representation, supra note 110, at 605.
See generally Lisa A. Stranger, Conflicts Between Attorneys and Social Workers
Representing Children in Delinquency Proceedings, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1123
(1996) (explaining the conflicts arising "when attorneys and social workers act
together in the representation of children in delinquency proceedings").
123

124
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period depend on several factors.1 29 The first consideration is the level
of seriousness of the alleged misconduct by the state agency.13 0 If the
misconduct is significant to the case-say failing to refer a parent to a
therapeutic service in a language they speak-it could negatively affect
a termination trial later or could result in a failed reunification.' 3 ' The
second factor is how compliant the parent is with the rest of the
performance agreement.1 32 A parent who is noncompliant with most
other tasks will probably not be able to successfully raise a defense
based on the State's reasonable efforts at a termination trial.113 Put
another way, when termination looks inevitable, the State has less
incentive to volunteer any more assistance than is minimally
required.1 34 The third consideration is avoidance of liability.' 3 5 Some
children will be reinjured, sometimes seriously, after reunification, just
as some children will be injured, sometimes seriously, while in foster
care. 136 By refraining from initiating any action that promotes
reunification, a State attorney avoids sharing blame for any negative
outcome with the parent.' 3 7
129 See generally AM.

REPRESENTING

BAR

Ass'N,

STANDARDS

CHILD WELFARE AGENCIES

OF

PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS

19-25 (2004) (considering

attorney

strategies in regard to child welfare cases).
130 See id. at 16.
131 See generally Esme N. DeVault, Reasonable Efforts Not So Reasonable: The
Termination of Parental Rights of a Developmentally Disabled Mother, 10 ROGER
WM. U.L. REV. 763, 769-70 (2005) (arguing that when a parent is not given access to
rehabilitative services, reasonable efforts have not been made).
132 See generally id. (finding that the parent complied with what little efforts were
made by the State).
'3 See generally CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, GROUNDS FOR INVOLUNTARY
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 1 (2013) (discussing the criteria for terminating
parental rights).
134 See generally id. (discussing instances where parental termination is inevitable).
Under the but-for standard for ineffective assistance claims, the same parent will
equally be able to expect less from their attorney by virtue of having additional
problems that arguably contributed to the outcome of the case. Timothy P. O'Neill,
Taking a Closer Look at 'Effective Assistance,' 154 CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Feb. 22,
2008.
1 FLA. STAT. § 409.993 (2015).
36 Elizabeth Bartholet, Creating A Child-Friendly Child Welfare System: Effective
EarlyIntervention to Prevent Maltreatment and Protect Victimized Children, 60 BUFF.
L. REV. 1323, 1357 (2012).
137 James C. Backstrom & Garry L. Walker, The Role of the Prosecutor in Juvenile
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Finally, probably the most important factor influencing a
petitioner's litigation strategy is how aggressive the judge is at holding
Judicial
the State accountable to the performance agreement.1 3 8
enforcement of compliance in Florida is accomplished through judicial
review findings and can be supplemented with rules to show cause
against the State.' 3 9 A parent can also seek a rule to show cause why
the child cannot be immediately reunified-a procedural mechanism
that, to our knowledge, has never been ruled upon by a Florida appellate
court.1 4 0 Not all judges are comfortable issuing contempt orders, and
not all judges are interested in micromanaging child welfare cases at the
sometimes inscrutable level of bureaucratic detail with which they
actually play out. A persistent judge can get results, either with a
scalpel or a sledgehammer, but the results are skewed towards the
priorities of the judge, not the parties, and the battles come at the cost of
Justice: Advocacy in the Courtroom and Leadership in the Community, WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 963, 968 (2005). This is of course a trolley problem. See PHILIPPA
FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 19 (Oxford

Univ. Press 2003). The prosecutor's failure to seek reunification in cases where it is
warranted is the substitution of a certain harm of delayed permanency for uncertain
fear of reunification. Id.
138 See Michele B. Neitz, A Unique Bench, A Common Code: EvaluatingJudicial
Ethics in Juvenile Court, 62 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 32, 33-34 (2011). Aggressiveness can
range from righteously angry and engaged to unproductively hostile or avoidant.
Terry A. Maroney, Angry Judges, 65 VAND. L. REv. 1207, 1207, 1271 (2012)
[hereinafter Maroney, Angry Judges]; Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Regulation and
Judicial Behavior, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1485, 1486 (2011) [hereinafter Maroney,
Emotional Regulation] (discussing that the problem of unproductive hostility from the
bench may actually be compounded by the lack of oversight, support, and review
provided to most judges).
"9 See generally HONORABLE WILLIAM G. JONES, WORKING WITH THE COURTS IN

CHILD PROTECTION I (3d ed. 2006) (discussing judicial review). The critiques of
contempt as an enforcement mechanism are well taken. See, e.g., Earl C. Dudley, Jr.,
Getting Beyond the Civil/CriminalDistinction: A New Approach to the Regulation of
Indirect Contempts, 79 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1031-32 (1993); Richard B. Kuhns, The
Summary Contempt Power: A Critique and A New Perspective, 88 YALE L.J. 39, 41
(1978); Margit Livingston, Disobedience and Contempt, 75 WASH. L. REv. 345, 42728 (2000). Much has been written about Congress's powers of contempt over the
executive branch, but far less is understood about the judicial branch's contempt
powers over the executive in child welfare cases. See Dudley, supra, at 1025-29;
Kuhns, supra, at 39; Livingston, supra, at 345. But see Gerard Glynn, Contempt: The
Untapped Power ofJuvenile Court, 15 FLA. COASTAL L. REv. 197, 200 (2014).
140

In re Z.J.S., 787 So. 2d 875, 876, 880 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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alienating the State actors that have to implement the judge's orders in
other cases. Rational strategies for the State's attorney in these
situations depend on the personality of the judge and the goal of
negotiating power and responsibilities across all of the cases that come
before that judge.
This point is important for our critique. The judge's heightened
power of review was a historical inheritance, but its continuation in the
modem system was a decision aimed at providing strict oversight of the
This judicial
Department of Children and Families' actions.141
oversight role is frequently cited when justifying the weakening of
traditional due process protections in child welfare cases. 142 Because of
these expanded judicial review requirements, the prosecutor's main
"adversary" during a dependency proceeding in many cases is not the
parent but the judge.1 43 The path of the case is shaped largely by the
style and priorities of that judge.' 44 The other parties-parents,
guardian ad litem, and child-can only be successful in bringing
challenges against the State to the extent they can enlist the judge in
their campaign, and State actions that anger the judge in other cases can
spill over into their case in unknown and unexpected ways.1 45 The
appellate court's traditional hands-off approach to dependency
proceedings has further cemented this dynamic, preventing anything but
basic procedural review by certiorari in a portion of the case with very
few procedural requirements to review.1 46 The result is that child
9e.

The Power of the Federal Courts, U.S. HIST., http://www.ushistory.org/gov/
9e.asp (last visited Nov. 7, 2015). A Florida court wrote in 2006: "The judge in a
termination proceeding is the fact finder, the sentinel of the child's best interest, and
an involved participant in the process." E.T. v. State, 930 So. 2d 721, 726 (Fla. Dist.
141

Ct. App. 2006).
142 See Kevin B. Frankel, The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Right to Family
Integrity Applied to Custody Cases Involving Extended Family Members, 40 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 301, 337 (2006). This was also the amicus position of the

Statewide Guardian ad Litem Program, arguing that effective assistance procedures
were not necessary in Florida due to judicial oversight. J.B. v. Fla. Dep't of Children
& Families, 170 So. 3d 780, 798 (Fla. 2015).
143 E. T, 930 So. 2d at 727.

Id.
Id.
146 Jeff Atkinson, Criteriafor Deciding Child Custody in the Trial and Appellate
Courts, 18 FAM. L.Q. 1, 16, 39-40 (1984).
144
I45
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welfare litigation, more so than probably any other area of law, is
shaped based on the personality of the person sitting on the bench.1 4 7
Far from ensuring due process, this arrangement almost guarantees
arbitrary outcomes, even for the State.
B.

Representing Parents

For a parents' attorney, the unintended consequences of the
convergence described above occur on the first day a case is filed.
When a parents' attorney receives a copy of the petition and goes over it
with the parents, one of three things can happen.1 4 8 The parents can
confirm the allegations, deny the allegations, or volunteer facts that
would constitute more allegations if the State knew of them.1 4 9
Allegations tend to result in predictable menus of services, so a parents'
attorney can roughly estimate the minimum amount of time for parents
to reach reunification and closure of the case."so The time required to
take a case to trial and appeal is also roughly calculable and is often
equal to or longer than the amount of time expected for the parents to
participate in services."'
Aggressive trial practice in child welfare cases is often
unsuccessful and frequently backfires. The lack of exclusionary rules
makes pretrial winnowing of facts almost nonexistent: the evidence will
likely be what is written in the petition and most conflicting evidence

147
148

Id. at 16.
See FLA. STAT. § 39.506(1) (2015) (indicating that a parent will also have to appear

for an arraignment hearing after the State files a dependency petition, and the parent

will also have to "admit, deny, or consent to findings of dependency alleged in the
petition").
149 See id.
15o See generally id. (stating that once a parent admits or consents to the petition a
disposition hearing will be held within fifteen days, but if a parent denies allegations
there will need to be another hearing in order to adjudicate the parent within thirty
days unless there is a continuance); id. § 39.521 (stating the process of a disposition
hearing where a judge makes decisions regarding the appropriate placement for the
child, determines the necessary protections and services, and reviews or approves the
suggested case plan with specific goals and steps for the parent).
"I' See Herring, Legal Representation, supra note 110, at 607 (discussing that children
spend a long period in foster home awaiting permanency).
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will be resolved against the parents.' 52 A defense predicated on
aggressive denial of the allegations, moreover, can draw the State's
attention to the case in negative ways, especially when the system does
not have sufficient resources for thorough investigation of every case
beyond the initial intake.1 53 Aggressive defense also raises red flags in
a system in which the main fitness measure is called "compliance." 154
For most parents' attorneys and most cases, the recommendation to take
a plea and begin engaging in services quickly is easy advice.15 5
Whether the parents accept the advice, of course, is beyond the
attorney's control. 156

The attorney's conundrum arises in how to advise a parent who
volunteers additional needs that could be addressed in the case plan. On
one hand, leaving the problem unaddressed could result in a failed
reunification.1 57 On the other hand, volunteering issues to the State

"

152 See generally § 39.502(3) (indicating that the petition will contain the allegations
of facts which, if true, establish that the child is a dependent child).
153 Soledad A. McGrath, Differential Response in Child Protection Services:
Perpetuatingthe Illusion of Voluntariness, 42 U. MEM. L. REv. 629, 630 (2012). This
dynamic cannot be understated. As written by Amy Sinden:
A key word in the prevailing social work discourse [of child
welfare] is thus "cooperation." This word often forms the focal
point of the meetings and conversations that take place in the
hallways of the courthouse: "If mom would just cooperate .....
Running as an undercurrent to this refrain are powerful cultural
stereotypes and expectations attached to motherhood. Mothers are
supposed to be nurturing, loving, and above all protective of their
children. Conflict is viewed as harmful to the child, and therefore
the mother accused of child abuse who creates conflict by failing to
"cooperate" harms her child a second time. This language of
"cooperation" cloaks the substantial power differential that exists
between the child welfare agency and the accused mother.
Amy Sinden, "Why Won't Mom Cooperate": Critiqueof Informality in Child Welfare
Proceedings, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 339, 354 (1999).
154 Sinden, supra note 153, at 354, 389.
155 See McGrath, supra note 153, at 659. A plea should not be mistaken for voluntary
participation, however. Id. at 666-67.
156 See FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.325(c) (stating that consent must be given voluntarily and
with full understanding).
157

See § 39.806(1)(e); M.S. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 765 So. 2d 152, 153

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that a final judgment terminating a mother's
parental rights was appropriate where the mother failed to substantially comply with a
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could result in performance agreement terms that could later be used
against the parent at a termination trial.15 8 But in child welfare cases the
goal is successful reunification, and parents who are seeking
reunification in good faith are left with a dangerous disclosure
dilemma. 15 9 Help comes with a catch.
The dilemma is made worse by the fact that the parents are
incentivized to withhold information even from their own therapeutic
treatment providers.16 0 The performance agreement phase of the case
involves intense monitoring and participation in services and therapies
with no right to confidentiality.161 The purpose of abrogating the
psychotherapist-patient privilege is to ensure that judges have
supposedly comprehensive information about parents when making
decisions regarding the best interests of the children.1 62 The result is
that the parents' disclosure dilemma extends even to the people seeking
to help them most.
Because the rational assumption under this system is that parents
are withholding information, the detection of small problems are
assumed to be evidence of much bigger undisclosed issues.' 63 It is
therefore a rational strategy, even for parents operating in good faith, to
wait and see whether an undisclosed issue will become serious enough
case plan). See generally Bailie, supra note 7 (illustrating the importance of having a
service plan that is tailored to the specific needs of a family and recognizes each
family's unique circumstance in order to provide the best opportunity of success and
reunification).
" See, e.g., R.N. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 25 So. 3d 697, 698-99 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2010) (illustrating the possibility of an unaddressed issue being used against
a parent where a court amended a case plan following an incident that indicated the
need for additional services).
'5 See § 39.522(2), (3) (establishing the standards for granting reunification). But see
supra note 46 and accompanying text.
160 See, e.g., R.N., 25 So. 3d at 698-99.
161 § 39.204.
162 See id. § 39.001.
6 In the Children & Youth Law Clinic students read The Case of Marie and Her
Sons on the first day of class. The article highlights how easily the child welfare
system can ignore overwhelming evidence of progress in a parent's life in favor of
isolated examples of set-backs. Daniel Bergner, The Case of Marie and Her Sons,
N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/23/magazine/
23welfare.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0.
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to be detected by the State. The detection of new issues sometimes
occurs through disclosure by the parents, but often is the result of vague
"concerns" of the other parties or judge. 164 These concerns are often
documented in the case plan as though they were adjudicated facts.1 6 5
The result is a ratcheting upward of tasks based on information that has
not undergone adversarial testing. A reasonable defense attorney takes
this into account when determining whether it is better for parents to
disclose early and appear cooperative or to withhold information and
appear more fit. If the parents' attorney miscalculates, a late-raised
issue could delay permanency by requiring reassessment of the case, but
a prematurely raised issue could result in needless tasks that overwhelm
the parents and increase the chances of failure and eventual termination
of parental rights.1 6 6
The disclosure dilemma extends beyond just the need for
services and also limits the parents' incentive to raise objections to the
quality of services. Parents who attend therapy for three months and do
nothing in the sessions but endure stories about the therapist's vacation
can either report the therapist's conduct and redo the sessions with
someone else (thus delaying the case), or accept the certification that
they finished the service and hope that whatever benefit they would
have received from the therapist does not prove to be the difference
between a successful and failed reunification.

'" See C.D. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 974 So. 2d 495, 502 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2008) ("While the trial court is permitted, and indeed required, to consider the
opinions of the caseworker and guardian ad litem, it cannot base its decision on
unsupported assertions."). "Concerns" are rampant in child welfare cases, especially
in the middle of the case where the rules do not apply. See id. At trials, at least, the
concerns must be substantiated, but that is often too late. See id.
1" Makos v. Prince, 64 So. 2d 670, 673 (Fla. 1953) (finding that "the taking of
evidence, subject to established safeguards, is the best way to resolve disputes
concerning adjudicative facts.").
166 Compare R.N. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 25 So. 3d 697, 698-99 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2010) (where ostensibly full disclosure resulted in a case plan with seventeen
tasks and where incidents of spousal abuse after case plan development resulted in
additional tasks being assigned, respectively), with S.Q. v. Dep't of Health & Rehab.
Servs., 687 So. 2d 319, 324-25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that the fact that the
mother failed to get timely psychiatric treatment or counseling to comply with the
permanency plan did not establish prospective abuse or neglect by clear and
convincing evidence; thus, did not support termination of parental rights).
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The disclosure dilemma even applies to the parents' ability to
report mistreatment of their own child in the system. Parents' attorneys
report that concerned parents are frequently seen as attempting to
disrupt the placement for their own advantage, especially when the
child disclosed only to them. This is particularly and tragically ironic
for the child, who may feel the most comfortable reporting
maltreatment to the parents when all of the other adults now in the
child's life are part of the same abusive system. A parents' attorney
presented with information of maltreatment in the foster home would
reasonably weigh the effect of the report coming from the parents and
look for strategies to get the information into the open without it
reflecting negatively on the parents.
The problems listed above are traceable to a fundamental
principle of child welfare law: noncompliance with even an arbitrary
performance agreement is tantamount to child maltreatment worthy of
termination of parental rights.1 67 This policy, developed by the
legislature as a response to the court's insistence that terminations could
only be predicated on actual harm, was meant to streamline cases and
prevent parents from dragging out an inevitable result with lackadaisical
efforts.1 68 This punitive proceduralization of child welfare law has had
the unanticipated consequence of incentivizing the same behaviors that
it sought to prevent.1 69 A rational parent's strategy under this regime is
to perform the tasks requested from the State and not a single thing
more, thus allowing substantive risks of harm to the child to remain
70
undisclosed.o
The goal of promoting the well-being of the children in
the system is completely undermined by isolating the party with the
most information and strongest incentive to advocate on behalf of that
child.

167 See, e.g., Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. S.H., 666 So. 2d 1039, 1040 (Fla.

Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
168 NANCY

M.

PINDUS

ET AL.,

PAPER #6:
ENSURING QUALITY IN
8 (2008), https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/

TOPICAL

CONTRACTED CHILD WELFARE SERVICES

files/pdf/7563 I/report.pdf.
169 1991-92 SAN DIEGO CTY. GRAND JURY, FAMILIES IN CRISIS: REPORT NO. 2 (1992).
170 See,
e.g., Reunification Plans:
Recipes for Failure, LIFTING VEIL,
http://www.liftingtheveil.org/reunificationplans.htm (last updated Oct. 2, 2010).
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PROMOTING EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

Before making recommendations about what could be, it is
important to recognize innovations in parents' representation that
already exist and are working well.171 High-quality representation
models, such as those described by Elizabeth Thornton and Betsy Gwin,
have achieved impressive results.' 72 These projects include highly
motivated and innovative practitioners and focus on changing the
structure of the representation, usually by decreasing caseloads and
increasing social support for the parents. 173 In contrast, this Article
suggests changes to the structure of the legal system that fostered the
less than high-quality behaviors that these models are measured
against.1 74
We believe these strategies go hand-in-hand.
The
fundamental premise that high-quality representation models and our
structural critiques share is that parents in the child welfare system are
better treated as subjects than objects. 175
A.

based

Aligning Substance and Process

The presence of a ground for termination of parental rights
on "noncompliance" is a significant threat to parental

"' See Elizabeth Thornton & Betsy Gwin, High-Quality Legal Representation for
Parents in Child Welfare Cases Results in Improved Outcomes for Families and
PotentialCost Savings, 46 FAM. L.Q. 139, 146-47 (2012).
172 Id. at 148-49, 151-52. Some of the outcomes of those programs included:
(1) providing parents with quality representation reduces the time
that children spend in foster care and leads to quicker permanency
for children across all permanency outcomes; (2) providing parents
with quality representation leads to faster and more successful
family reunifications; and (3) providing parents with representation
during the child protective services investigation reduces the need
for foster care placement.
Id.
While the results from these programs provide impressive outcomes for the
families and children involved, they can also reduce federal, state, and county
costs associated with foster care. Id.
17 Id. at 142, 146, 148.
174 See infra Section VI.B.
"' See infra Section VI.B.
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participation.1 7 6 For a person to engage in a process requires the person
to be able to voice disagreement and grievances without fear of
reprisal.1 7 7 For all the reasons discussed above, threatening parents who
are participating in good faith with termination results in
counterproductive isolation of the parents.' 7
Similarly, terminations
based solely on the passage of time should be equally eliminated.' 7 9 As
the case studies show, trial courts readily recognize that families resolve
their problems (or do not) at different paces.' 8 0 The presence of timebased doctrines that are not being universally enforced only serves to
punish families who are deemed less worthy of extensions, while
punitively strict adherence to time limits only creates arbitrary
outcomes based on events outside of anybody's control.1 8
Once parents are free to fully participate, courts and the
Legislature should move towards incentivizing parents and their
attorneys to actively engage in the process.1 8 2 Case plans should no
longer be a tool of coercive control over the parents but a mechanism
for all parties and participants to identify barriers and opportunities for
promoting the well-being of the child and holding responsible parties
176

See Garrison, supra note 41.

177

FLA. BAR STANDING

COMM. ON THE LEGAL NEEDS OF CHILDREN,

FLORIDA

GUIDELINES OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND
NEGLECT

CASES

14

(2014

ed.

2006),

https://www.floridabar.org/TFB/

TFBResources.nsf/Attachments/5857B88CB9C5417A85257B870075DFAF/$FILE/
LegalNeedsofChildrenDependency.pdPOpenElement (explaining the attorney-client
privilege for a guardian ad litem attorney for a child).
178 See supra Section IV.A. In fact, a parent's "good-faith" effort may be sufficient to
prevent termination of parental rights in some states. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22,

§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(iv) (2015).
See D.F. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 877 So. 2d 733, 733-35 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that denying a continuance may be sufficient grounds to
reverse a judgment for termination of parental rights because it violates the due
process rights of the parent).
18o See Overview of Case Studies, supra note 24.
179

'81 But see J.B. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 768 So. 2d 1060, 1067 (Fla.
2000) (holding that time provisions may be necessary to prevent a parent's neglect
from defeating the proceeding).
182 See Kathleen A. Kearney et al., Performance-Based Contracting in Residential
Care and Treatment: Driving Policy and Practice Change Through Public-Private
Partnershipin Illinois, CHILD WELFARE J., Mar. 2010, at 39 (citing the need for the
courts and legislature to begin incentivizing active engagement in the process).
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accountable. Beginning with the State's obligations, the procedural
rules should encourage the litigation of the State's reasonable efforts in
a timely manner so that problems are resolved expeditiously.' 8 3 The
current method of promoting reasonable efforts comes too late and with
only one penalty: the State cannot terminate a parent's rights, thus
returning the parent and child back to the faulty dependency
proceedings.1 8 4 As critics have pointed out, this is a poor accountability
mechanism. 8 5
This Article proposes instead a system of mutual accountability
between the parents and the State. Parents should have an obligation
under this system to raise problems early and often so that they can be
resolved by the parties and the court. To that end, all "reasonable
efforts" litigation-including the provision of services, visitations,
placement, and other terms of the case plan-should be raised during
the dependency phase. Otherwise, the court should deem the reasonable
efforts waived in the termination phase.1 8 6 No case should proceed to a
termination trial with the parents' reasonable efforts objections still
pending.1 8 7 So that parents are not punished for their attorney's
inaction, failure of an attorney to raise an obvious reasonable efforts
objection should be grounds for a finding of ineffective assistance and

See Calkins, supra note 9 (referring to the need for procedural rules which
encourage timely efforts).
184 See generally CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 133 (showing that all
states require reasonable efforts).
1" See Herring, Inclusion, supra note 76, at 140 (discussing the inclusion of the
Reasonable Efforts Requirement in Termination of Parental Rights Statutes).
186 See generally Patricia Rudden, An Analysis of Collaborative Courts in Child
Welfare: Santa Clara County Family Wellness Court and Dependency Drug
Treatment Court, in BASSC EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENT TRAINING PROGRAM
PARTICIPANTS'
CASE
STUDIES
CLASS
OF
2011, at 55, 60 (2011),
http://mackcenter.berkeley.edu/assets/files/edp-cases/CHI/TOC-CHI- 113.pdf
(explaining that in a new pilot court for maltreated infants and toddlers, parents
engage in completing their case plans immediately because the reunification time
period is only six months).
1" See generally CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 133 (showing that all
states require some sort of reasonable efforts, and although reasonable efforts are
required, "the child's health and safety constitute the paramount concern in
determining the extent to which reasonable efforts should be made").
'
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return to the dependency phase.' 8 8
To balance out this strict requirement on parents, reasonable
efforts objections should be subject to plenary, but expedited appellate
review.189 Errors in case planning, and other conditions of the case,
should be corrected early so that they are not compounded over years
until finally reviewed at a termination trial. 190 However, to discourage
the need for appellate review, attorneys' fees should be charged directly
against the contracted private agency for unreasonably opposing a
parent's motion or objection instead of remedying the identified
problem. More detail on possible fee structures is found in the next
Section.
Conversely, the State has an interest in holding parents
accountable to their children as well. 1 9 1 Good-faith participation by the
parents should include meaningful efforts to change conditions that
parents actually control.1 92 To help parents appropriately identify their
own needs and abilities-and the needs of their children-the State
should provide funding for parents to retain their own social workers or
"reunification specialists" through their attorney as is done in other
188

Id.

After a recent amendment to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, one district
court ruled that orders on motions that fully resolve the issues of the motion are
directly appealable. W.W. v. Guardian Ad Litem Program, 159 So. 3d 999, 1000-01
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015). This would appear to permit full appeal of any motion
heard during the dependency phase, but the practical effect of this shift is yet to be
seen. Compare id. (relating to the amendment of FLA. R. APP. P. 9.130(a)(4)), with
Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Honeycutt, 609 So. 2d 596, 596 (Fla. 1992)
(holding that child dependency proceedings are not "domestic relations matters").
19o See Gary Padgett, The Right to Counsel for Indigent Parents in Termination
Proceedings: A CriticalAnalysis of Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 21 J.
FAM. L. 83, 96-102 (1992) (discussing the substance and nature of termination
proceedings).
191 See generally Matthew
I. Fraidin, Heuristics, Cognitive Biases, and
189

Accountability: Decision-Making in Dependency Court, 90 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 913,

930 (2013) (explaining that dependency cases involve decisions with high stakes that
can mean life and death to the children involved).
192 See generally Huntington, Missing Parents,supra note 7, at 140-44 (discussing the
goals of the problem-solving model of the child welfare system, its benefits, and how
control, autonomy, and power are not easy concepts, especially in the contexts of
poverty, mental health, and interpersonal violence). The child welfare system in
general could do better with these complexities. Id.
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states.' 9 3 The State should create a marketplace where parents can
choose social workers with experience with their particular needs, and
parents should be free to fire or replace their reunification specialist
without interference from the State or court. Furthermore, the specialist
should be bound by the attorney-client privilege until such time as that
privilege is waived, so that parents are able to discuss all areas of their
lives free from fear of reprisal by the State. 194
These
innovations, consistent with
the high-quality
representation models discussed above, would provide parents with
control over the quality and type of assistance they receive, would align
the child welfare service market with the needs of parents and families
and not the needs of the agencies that currently contract with them, and,
most importantly, would help transform the process into one focused on
solving identified problems. 195
B.

Aligning Payment and Process

The Florida Supreme Court has long recognized that
compensation is integral to ensuring that counsel provides meaningful
and effective representation.1 96 Yet, even a cursory analysis of the
existing fee structure shows flaws that undermine the goal of
maximizing parental participation. 9 7 Our review of the billing records
193 See, e.g., Joseph T. Flies-Away & Carrie E. Garrow, Healing to Wellness Courts:
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REv. 403, 450 (citing Nicolette M.
Pach, An Overview of OperationalFamily Dependency Treatment Courts, 6 DRUG CT.
REV. 67 (2008)) (explaining how a "family wellness court" utilizes team members to
represent and respond to different roles for each family member).
194 See generally FLA. BAR STANDING COMM. ON THE LEGAL NEEDS OF CHILDREN,
supra note 177 (explaining the attorney-client privilege for a Guardian ad Litem
attorney for a child).
195

See supra Part V.

196 See Remeta v. State, 559 So. 2d 1132, 1134-36 (Fla. 1990) (applying Makemson
and White principles to counsel appointed pursuant to statute); White v. Bd. of Cty.
Comm'rs of Pinellas Cty., 537 So. 2d 1376, 1380 (Fla. 1989) (stating that statutory fee
caps create "a risk that counsel will spend fewer than the hours required to represent
the defendant" and the "relationship between an attorney's compensation and the
quality of his or her representation cannot be ignored"); Makemson v. Martin Cty.,
491 So. 2d 1109, 1110 (Fla. 1986) (holding that inflexible fee caps are
unconstitutional).
197 Makemson, 491 So. 2d at 1112. (holding that the compensation scheme found in
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shows that 98% of dependency invoices were billed at the flat rate.1 9 8 it
was not possible to calculate the hourly rate of compensation for
attorneys who accepted the flat rate because they were not required to
submit a record of their hours, but the compensation structure-$800 at
the conclusion of the dependency trial, $200 for each year thereafter,
and $1,000 at the filing of a petition to terminate the parent's rightscauses serious concerns.' 99 At the dependency phase, the current
structure disincentivizes work to be performed in the "donut hole"
which comes between the payment of $800 at disposition and the $200
payment a year later. 200 It instead encourages attorneys to allow
difficult cases to stagnate to the point the State files a petition for
termination. 20 1 The attorney must then only make minimally effective
objections at a trial to collect $1,000.202

It is troubling that although parents' attorneys could take a fewer
number of cases and bill hourly for intensive, high-quality work, in
general they do not.20 3 This Article has suggested that this is in part
because legal doctrines discourage parents from actually taking vocal
positions on their cases.2 04 Consideration must also be given to the
usual suspect when discussing indigent defense: perhaps the funding
structures, despite their apparent generosity, serve to dissuade attorneys

Florida Statute section 925.036 is unconstitutional when it is "applied in such a
manner as to curtail the court's inherent power to ensure the adequate representation
of the criminally accused").
" More than half of cases billed hourly were from one particular county. An
adjacent county had the only other significant number at 13%. For termination of
parental rights cases, 99% of invoices were filed at the flat rate. Again, the same
county accounted for half of the termination cases where excess fees were sought. See
Overview of Case Studies, supra note 24.
1 See FLA. STAT. § 27.5304(6)(a) (2015).
200
201

202

Id.
Id.

See id.
See supra Section IV.C.
20 See generally Charisa Smith, The Conundrum of Family Reunification: A
Theoretical, Legal, and PracticalApproach to Reunification Services for Parents with
Mental Disabilities, 26 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 307 (2015) [hereinafter Smith, The
Conundrum ofFamily Reunification](discussing the discouragement parents face with
the legal doctrine in place).
203
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from engaging in high-quality representation.205
The problems of
indigent defense funding extend far beyond the child welfare system,
and solving it is beyond the scope of this project. There are alternative
fee structures that may function better than the current "phase-byphase" fixed-fee system. 2 0 6 Each of these alternatives highlights a
problem with the current system.
The simplest fee structure would be an annual salary for parents'
attorneys who agree to accept a minimum number of clients, even if
those numbers are not steady. 2 07 The current fee structure discourages
attorneys from entering and remaining in the field of parent
representation because payment is withheld until disposition and a
stable wage is contingent on receiving a steady flow of new clients each
month. 2 0 8 The cyclical rise and fall of child welfare investigations
further exacerbates an attorney's financial uncertainty and pushes them
towards other areas of law with higher rates and steadier client
streams. 2 0 9
One goal of a fee structure should be to minimize
disruptions in the workforce. 2 10 A system in which a smaller number of
attorneys commit to a career in child welfare work would appear
superior to a system in which a larger number of attorneys constantly
dip in and out.
A second alternative-unit fees-would compensate attorneys
for the actions they perform on their cases. 2 11 A simple unit-fee system
would assign fixed rates to tasks such as reviewing a case plan,
attending a judicial review hearing, or interviewing a witness or service
provider. 2 12 Unit fee pricing could be used to incentivize parent
participation by assigning higher rates to attorney actions that further
the client's involvement in the case, such as filing a motion or
See Susanne M. Bookser, Making Gault Meaningful: Access to Counsel and
Quality of Representation in Delinquency Proceedingsfor Indigent Youth, 3 WHITTIER
J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 297, 305-06 (2004).
206 See JERRY M. CUSTIS, LITIGATION MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK § 4:25 (2014).
207 See id. § 4:13.
208 See id.
209 See id.
205

210 See id.
211 See id.
212 See id.
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objection, while assigning lower rates to actions that are simply
compliance monitoring and court appearance.2 1 3 The downside to unit
fees is that attorneys must document their tasks; though by being less
granular than hourly billing, unit fee pricing is also less onerous. 2 14 The
current system compensates reading a judicial review report prepared
by the State at the same rate as proactively investigating a case.2 15
A third alternative is to create stronger incentives for parents'
attorneys to investigate and litigate the State's noncompliance through
automatic fee-shifting provisions that put the cost of enforcement on the
private agency that is found responsible for the breach.2 16 One benefit
of fee shifting is that it can be handled at the trial level between the
parties, and payment can be immediate. 2 17 One downside is that it
requires the attorney to document time, which could result in litigation
over the appropriateness of fees. 218 The current system leaves quality
review to contract managers who may have imperfect information about
the experiences of families engaged in those services.2 1 9
These alternatives are just a starting point for discussion. Any
full study into the compensation system must first examine the reasons
that attorneys currently choose not to seek fees in excess of the flat rate.
Do attorneys believe that they must show that the case involved
"extraordinary issues" in order to be paid for the hours they worked?
Are attorneys stymied by the hassle of recording time and litigating
their right to the fee? Do they refrain from seeking excess fees because
See id.
See id.
215 See id.
216 See Maroney, Angry Judges, supra note 138. See generally Maroney, Emotional
Regulation, supra note 138 (considering a judge's emotional reactions during
sentencing).
217 See CUSTIS, supra note 206, § 4:1 (finding that attention should be given to
"matching litigation costs to the value provided," "adjusting the upside and downside
risks as between company and outside counsel," "improving the predictability of
fees," and "keeping work quality high").
218 Id. Even with these drawbacks, private enforcement may still be more efficient
and effective than the current quality assurance mechanisms focused solely on contract
performance monitoring and aggregate outcome measures. Id.
219 See id. § 7:6 (finding the quality of cases is lowered as more individuals become
involved).
213

214
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of the real or perceived threat that doing so will cause them to be
removed from the registry in retaliation? Is there simply not enough for
them to do on any given case?
Extrinsic barriers to attorney
engagement must be addressed irrespective of the fee structure adopted.
C.

Studying Quality Representation in Florida

While the State has long guaranteed parents the right to
appointed counsel in both dependency and termination of parental rights
cases, there has never been a concerted effort to ensure that attorneys
actually
provide
parents
with
meaningful
and
effective
220
representation.
There is no quality control or quality assurance
mechanism associated with the agency that compensates private courtappointed counsel. 2 2 1 Neither the Florida Bar nor the Florida Supreme
Court has undertaken an evaluation of the performance of parents'
counsel.2 22 In contrast to counsel for dependent children, parents'
counsel do not even have a set of guidelines or standards to guide
practice or serve as a starting point for measurement.22 3
Recognizing that the project of measuring the "quality" of
representation is itself controversial and the lack of data on
representation of parents in Florida is problematic, we propose the
following questions for study.2 24

220

See infra Sections VIA-B.

The Justice Administrative Commission serves as the State's budget entity for
funding the Office of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel as well as for
contract attorneys. JUST. ADMIN. COMMISSION, http://www.justiceadmin.org (last
visited Apr. 18, 2016).
221

Florida has an integrated bar, so all lawyers licensed to practice are members of the
Florida Bar. Regulation of Lawyer Conduct, FLA. B., http://www.floridabar.org/tfb/
TFBLawReg.nsf (last visited Apr. 18, 2016).
The Florida Bar and the Florida
Supreme Court share responsibility for bar admission and the regulation of lawyer
conduct. Id.
223 The Florida Bar Standing Committee on the Legal Needs of Children has
promulgated the "Guidelines for Practice for Attorneys Who Represent Children in
222

Abuse and Neglect Cases." See FLA. BAR STANDING COMM. ON THE LEGAL NEEDS OF

CHILDREN, supra note 177.
See supra Section V.B.

224
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What standards do we want for parent representation, and how
should they be taught and enforced? The American Bar Association
has promulgated Standards of Practice for Attorneys Representing
Parents in Abuse and Neglect Cases that can either be adopted
wholesale or adapted to be specific to Florida.2 2 5 Absent a specific list
of steps that competent counsel is required to take, neither the court nor
the client may have an understanding of the minimal acts counsel
should undertake. 2 2 6 Once standards of representation are in place, the
next logical step is to set up a review system to determine whether
counsel are meeting those standards in each case. 2 2 7 The State should
not continue to compensate lawyers who do not fulfill the minimum
expectations of representation in each case.
Is there a difference between staff attorneys and private
attorneys, and is that problematic? A second area for future inquiry is
whether there is a substantial difference between the representation
provided by the offices of civil regional counsels and the representation
provided by court-appointed private attorneys. 2 2 8 And, given that the
regional counsel offices are independently run by appointed heads, is
there a difference even among them? Such a difference would matter
because if parents under each representation model receive differing
treatment based on nothing more than the order they were standing in
on the first day of court, then that would appear to raise significant

225 See generally AM. BAR ASS'N HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note 85

(finding and
identifying "important directions for lawyers representing children in juvenile court
matters generally").
226

Id.

&

227 See generally Jilian Cohen & Michelle Cortese, CornerstoneAdvocacy in the First
60 Days: Achieving Safe and Lasting Reunification for Families, 38 ABA CHILD L.
PRAC. 3 (2009) (finding that the State may want to promote and evaluate use of the
best practice "Cornerstone Advocacy" model which focuses parent representation on
four cornerstone activities: placement, services, conferences and visitation to support
family reunification). In addition, Cornerstone Advocacy was created by the New
York City Center for Family Representation and first explained in Jilian Cohen
Michelle Cortese, CornerstoneAdvocacy in the First 60 Days: Achieving Safe and
Lasting Reunificationfor Families, 38 ABA CHILD L. PRAC. 3, 1-2 (2009).
228 See

INDICATORS

OF

SUCCESS

FOR

PARENT

REPRESENTATION

1

(2015),

http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abaladministrative/childlaw/ParentRep/
lndicators-of-Success.authcheckdam.pdf.
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equal protection issues.2 2 9 Given that most "first" parents are mothers
while fathers are found later and appointed private counsel, the issue
may deserve heightened scrutiny. 2 3 0
What role does geography play in access to quality
representation? Geography appeared to play a role in litigation
practices among private attorneys. 2 3 1 Ripe for study is also whether
there is a difference in the "outputs" of counsel depending on location
and their status as private or staff. Such a study should explore if staff
attorneys at different regional counsel offices contest more petitions,
file more motions, attend more staffings, and communicate with clients
more than private counsel.
The studies of high-quality representation models suggest that
such variables matter greatly. 2 3 2 If the split use of offices and private
attorneys in Florida is causing different outcomes for different families,
then that must be addressed-not by lowering the bar but by raising it
for everyone, so that every child has an equal opportunity for successful
return to the home.
The availability of competent counsel with
adequate resources to do the job should not vary by the accident of
geography or whether the client is the second parent named on the
petition.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Prior to the Florida Supreme Court's ruling on ineffective
assistance of counsel in termination cases, the lack of a standard and
procedure stood as a conspicuous omission, suggesting that parents'
struggles to retain their parental rights were nothing but selfish
roadblocks to their children's well-being. 2 3 3 The creation of the
standard filled an unsightly gap but did so in a way that threatened to

229
230

See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
See, e.g., In re D.B., 385 So. 2d 83, 87 (Fla. 1980).

For example, the large variance in the use of expert witnesses by private attorneys
by circuit. Overview of Case Studies, supra note 24; Robert Latham & Robin
Rosenberg, Data Write-Up (June 17, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
authors).
232 See supra note 100 and accompanying
text.
233 See supra Part V.
231

160

Florida CoastalLaw Review

[Vol. 17:109

cast unarguably bad lawyering as "effective" just because a parent
cannot prove but-for causation. 234 Without strong expectations for
professional conduct and a clear understanding of the connection
between the parents' representation and the well-being of their child,
the effective assistance standard risks further entrenching the idea that
families who need the most help should reasonably expect the least. 2 3 5
This does not have to be the case. The system should no longer
expect parents to be quietly thankful for unnecessary, inefficient, or
ineffective interventions, and parents should no longer have to fear
raising concerns about both quality and safety for themselves and their
children-especially under a threat of termination of parental rights. A
robust doctrine of effective assistance by parents' attorneys is one step
in a system where its own effectiveness is in dire need of repair.

234 See supra Section V.A.
235

See supra Part VI.

